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Reference ID	Subject	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09MOSCOW2932		2009-12-03	2011-02-02	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Moscow
08TRIPOLI526	LIBYA SEEKS TO BLACKMAIL EUROPEAN MISSIONS FOR VISAS	2008-07-03	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI592	THUG LIFE: HANNIBAL AL-QADHAFI'S ARREST PROMPTS FISSURE IN	2008-07-22	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI63		2009-01-28	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10DOHA60	QATAR JANUARY 2010 VISAS VIPER MEETING AND	2010-02-11	2011-02-01	SECRET	Embassy Doha
05SAOPAULO1321	H2B VISAS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY	2005-12-01	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Consulate Sao Paulo
06BRASILIA2379	EMBASSY BRASILIA R1 VALIDATION STUDY	2006-11-09	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Brasilia
08TRIPOLI6	LIBYA IMPOSES NEW CURRENCY REQUIREMENT FOR TOURISTS	2008-01-07	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI372	PD PROGRAMS FALL VICTIM TO BILATERAL TENSIONS REF: TRIPOLI 289	2008-05-08	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI242		2009-03-19	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI268	FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000268 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009, only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services on March 25, 2009. Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated. Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any, security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the host-country government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work. b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. However, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in accord with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could possibly require. We continue to monitor these cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud. c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based IVcases. d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website. e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation . We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents TRIPOLI 00000268 002.2 OF 003 include a photo, but are only in Arabic. f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case. g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date. h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases. i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular (illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies. j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS. k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified. The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has said that it is planning to use one national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth through their entire life. Under this scheme, passport numbers would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release by September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new passport. More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document into question. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry began the process of "correcting" the last names of TRIPOLI 00000268 003.2 OF 003 Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. The applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page. l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular Section is not allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud. m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing, we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis has been a financial burden. Most of these applicants will likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to fraud in their applications. We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected, and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for interviews. n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation. CRETZ	2009-04-01	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI269	FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000269 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.	2009-04-01	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI495	FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS	2009-06-22	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI496	FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS	2009-06-22	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI497	FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS	2009-06-22	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09SECTION02OF03QRIPOLI583	BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP	2009-07-20	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI583	BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP TRIPOLI 00000583 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)	2009-07-20	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI584	BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP TRIPOLI 00000584 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1.(S/NF) Summary. Your visit to Libya will set the tone and agenda for the bilateral relationship over the next several months. Libyan officials seek clarification of the Administration's policy toward Libya, especially after their mishandling of the Fathi al-Jahmi case, and are unsure of the degree of engagement they can expect. They continue to complain that Libya has not been adequately "rewarded" for previous policy decisions to give up its WMD programs and support for terrorism, yet they are remiss in meeting key WMD deadlines. You can lay out the path toward increased engagement in the wake of the new Washington consensus and press for real progress. Potential deliverables from the visit include: a statement announcing the intention to engage in a Human Rights Dialogue and a Political-Military Dialogue with high-level State officials; Libya's signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement; formation of a visas working group to discuss bilateral visa problems; and setting a date to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). You can also privately raise the notion of establishing a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue, incumbent upon GOL signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement. The Libyans will be looking for a concept of how we envision conducting the human rights dialogue and assurances regarding the possibility of a meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. They will also continue to press for security assurances. End Summary.	2009-07-20	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI599		2009-07-27	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI638	PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632 TRIPOLI 00000638 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)	2009-08-05	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI639	PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES -- CORRECTED COPY REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632; C) TRIPOLI 638 TRIPOLI 00000639 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)	2009-08-05	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI695	LIBYAN MFA REQUESTS DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR QADHAFI'S PLANE, TAKES STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO RELATIONSHIP REF: TRIPOLI 692 TRIPOLI 00000695 001.2 OF 002	2009-08-27	2011-01-31	SECRET	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI740	EMBASSY TRIPOLI RESPONSE: 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AND REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS REF: STATE 68590	2009-09-14	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI772	FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000772 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.	2009-09-30	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI773	FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000773 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.	2009-09-30	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI832	SWISS PONDERING TOUGH NEW MEASURES IN LIGHT OF LIBYAN INTRANSIGENCE REF: TRIPOLI 763 TRIPOLI 00000832 001.2 OF 002	2009-10-19	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI58	EUROPEAN DCM'S ON LIBYA ISSUES CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)	2010-01-21	2011-01-31	SECRET	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI78	SENIOR LIBYAN JUSTICE OFFICIAL: LESS TALK, MORE ACTION IS BEST TRIPOLI 00000078 001.2 OF 002	2010-01-27	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI79	TECHNOLOGY TO TOURISM: HEAD OF INVESTMENT AUTHORITY DISCUSSES OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN LIBYA	2010-01-28	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI91	SWISS SCORE IN LIBYA: HAMDANI CLEARED OF IMMIGRATION CHARGES REF: A) TRIPOLI 73; B) TRIPOLI 58	2010-02-01	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI100	HEAD OF LIBYAN IMMIGRATION: U.S. BUSINESSMEN ARE WELCOME CLASSIFIED	2010-02-04	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI106	TRIPOLI VISAS VIPER REPORT: JANUARY 2010	2010-02-09	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI112		2010-02-10	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI114	GOL FUNDING INCREASING NUMBERS OF STUDENTS IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES TRIPOLI 00000114 001.2 OF 003 1.(SBU)	2010-02-10	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI134	LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON THREAT TO DECLARE SCHENGEN VISA WAR REF: TRIPOLI 112 TRIPOLI 00000134 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)	2010-02-16	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI137	MEETING OF LIBYAN, ITALIAN AND MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTERS LIKELY TO LEAD TO RESOLUTION OF SCHENGEN VISA CRISIS	2010-02-17	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
10TEGUCIGALPA2	AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS NEED	2010-01-05	2011-01-29	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN	Embassy Tegucigalpa
10CAIRO344	ILLEGAL ADOPTIONS IN EGYPT	2010-02-22	2011-01-28	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Cairo
10KUWAIT166	VISA REVOCATION KUWAIT	2010-02-24	2011-01-28	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Kuwait
03THEHAGUE2113	TERRORIST FINANCE:THE HAGUE - NOTIFICATION OF	2003-08-21	2011-01-27	SECRET	Embassy The Hague
10AMSTERDAM8	VISAS VIPER WATCHLIST NOMINATION	2010-02-26	2011-01-19	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Consulate Amsterdam
06REYKJAVIK22	FRAUD SUMMARY - ICELAND	2006-01-18	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK335	ICELAND DEMANDS APOLOGY IN DETENTION CASE	2007-12-13	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK336	ICELANDIC TRAVELER DETAINED BY DHS IN NEW YORK CREATES	2007-12-13	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK337	ICELAND MEDIA ROUNDUP: MEDIA FIRESTORM OVER DEPORTATION	2007-12-14	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK346	Icelandic Foreign Ministry welcomes DHS letter on	2007-12-19	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Reykjavik
08REYKJAVIK44	HAGUE ADOPTION LETTER DELIVERED TO GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND	2008-03-27	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Reykjavik
08REYKJAVIK275	ICELAND: CONSIDERING RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL FOR TERRORIST	2008-11-25	2011-01-13	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Reykjavik
09REYKJAVIK23	ICELAND SIGNS TIFA, PUSHES FOR E VISAS	2009-01-28	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Reykjavik
09REYKJAVIK30	ICELAND CENTRAL BANK CRISIS: ODDSSON'S NAILS FLAG TO MAST	2009-02-09	2011-01-13	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Reykjavik

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