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Reference ID	Subject	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LONDON2574	UK COUNTRY CLEARANCE IS GRANTED TO LUTE AND DELEGATION, OCT 21-23, 2008 REF: WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC CABLE	2008-10-09	2011-02-04	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy London
08LONDON2814	POC FOR NODEL SANDERS (NOV 9-13)	2008-11-07	2011-02-04	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy London
08LONDON3191	UNITED KINGDOM: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM	2008-12-22	2011-02-04	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy London
10SANAA5	01/04/2010 SANA'A EAC RECOMMENDS REOPENING OF EMBASSY	2010-01-04	2011-02-03	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Sanaa
07KAMPALA1752		2007-11-13	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Kampala
07LONDON4311	POSSIBLE NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/OFFER OF	2007-11-21	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy London
07BRATISLAVA630	NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT PRIBENIK, SLOVAKIA REF: 06 STATE 163201 Classified By: Lawrence R. Silverman, Deputy Chief of Mission, for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)	2007-11-29	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Bratislava
07TASHKENT2063	WMD PORTAL DETECTION IN UZBEKISTAN	2007-12-03	2011-02-01	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tashkent
07TASHKENT2081	UPDATE ON WMD PORTAL DETECTION IN UZBEKISTAN REF: A. STATE 163194 B. TASHKENT 2063 Classified By: DTRA Fred Carter and Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).	2007-12-05	2011-02-01	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tashkent
07BRATISLAVA648	UPDATE ON NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT PRIBENIK, SLOVAKIA REF: A. 06 STATE 163201 B. BRATISLAVA 00630 Classified By: Lawrence R. Silverman, Deputy Chief of Mission, reason 1 .4(b) and (d)	2007-12-06	2011-02-01	SECRET	Embassy Bratislava
07TASHKENT2171	WMD PORTAL DETECTION UPDATE: LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON OPENING THE RAIL CAR REF: A. STATE 163194 B. TASHKENT 2063 C. TASHKENT 2081 D. TASHKENT 2090 Classified By: DTRO Chief Fred Carter and Poloff Steven Prohaska for re asons 1.4 (b, d).	2007-12-27	2011-02-01	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tashkent
08TASHKENT43	RADIATION DETECTION UPDATE: GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN PASSES QUESTION RESPONSES, COMMISSION'S FINDINGS REF: A. 07 STATE 163194 B. 07 TASHKENT 2063 C. 07 TASHKENT 2081 D. 07 TASHKENT 2090 E. TD-314/79205-07 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska and DTRO Chief Fred Carter for re asons 1.4 (b, d).	2008-01-10	2011-02-01	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tashkent
08KABUL266	NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT	2008-02-02	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Kabul
08KABUL297	UPDATE: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT KABUL,	2008-02-05	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Kabul
08KAMPALA266	NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION IN KAMPALA- FEBRUARY 12, 2008 REF: SECSTATE 162091	2008-02-12	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Kampala
08STATE77144	NUCLEAR FORENSICS EXPERTS PLAN PATH FORWARD	2008-07-17	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Secretary of State
08LAPAZ2037	BOLIVIA: REQUEST USG VISITORS POSTPONE TRAVEL	2008-09-19	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz
08TRIPOLI889	TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA	2008-11-16	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI921	LIBYA SEEKS TO DOWNPLAY TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA	2008-11-30	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI5	LIBYAN REACTIONS TO GAZA: PUBLIC OUTRAGE, PRIVATE PRAGMATISM REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988, B) TRIPOLI 984	2009-01-05	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI30	LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988, B) 08 TRIPOLI 984, C) TRIPOLI 005 TRIPOLI 00000030 001.2 OF 003	2009-01-14	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI63		2009-01-28	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI154	LIBYA 2009 TIP REPORT SUBMISSION REF: 08 STATE 132759	2009-02-17	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09STATE39054	REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE ARREST OF	2009-04-20	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Secretary of State
09BUJUMBURA302	NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: STATE 030541 Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b) (d).	2009-07-02	2011-02-01	SECRET	Embassy Bujumbura
09BUJUMBURA378	NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: A. STATE 75013 B. BUJUMBURA 00302 Classified By: CDA Charles Twining for reasons 1.4 (b) (d).	2009-08-07	2011-02-01	SECRET	Embassy Bujumbura
09MEXICO3378	PORTAL DETECTION AT MANZANILLO, MEXICO (FALSE ALERT)	2009-12-01	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Mexico
09MOSCOW2943	ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT THE RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN BORDER REF: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FSN AND RUSSIAN CUSTOMS OFFICER RELAYED TO EXBS ADVISOR Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, C, D).	2009-12-04	2011-02-01	SECRET	Embassy Moscow
09BUJUMBURA689	NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT	2009-12-17	2011-02-01	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Bujumbura
10DOHA60	QATAR JANUARY 2010 VISAS VIPER MEETING AND	2010-02-11	2011-02-01	SECRET	Embassy Doha
05LIMA3571		2005-08-17	2011-02-01	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Lima
07HARARE1073		2007-11-30	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Harare
09TRIPOLI190	SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - SPRING	2009-02-27	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI242		2009-03-19	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI268	FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000268 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009, only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services on March 25, 2009. Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated. Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any, security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the host-country government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work. b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. However, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in accord with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could possibly require. We continue to monitor these cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud. c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based IVcases. d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website. e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation . We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents TRIPOLI 00000268 002.2 OF 003 include a photo, but are only in Arabic. f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case. g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date. h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases. i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular (illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies. j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS. k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified. The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has said that it is planning to use one national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth through their entire life. Under this scheme, passport numbers would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release by September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new passport. More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document into question. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry began the process of "correcting" the last names of TRIPOLI 00000268 003.2 OF 003 Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. The applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page. l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular Section is not allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud. m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing, we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis has been a financial burden. Most of these applicants will likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to fraud in their applications. We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected, and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for interviews. n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation. CRETZ	2009-04-01	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI269	FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000269 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.	2009-04-01	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI679	TRIPOLI EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING: AUGUST 20,	2009-08-20	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI685	MEGRAHI RETURNS TO LIBYA ACCOMPANIED BY SAIF AL-ISLAM	2009-08-21	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI686	QADHAFI PERSONALLY WELCOMES LOCKERBIE BOMBER	2009-08-23	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI692	LIBYAN PROTOCOL CHIEF ON PLANS FOR SEPTEMBER 1, NEW YORK	2009-08-26	2011-01-31	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI772	FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000772 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.	2009-09-30	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI773	FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000773 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.	2009-09-30	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI948	MGSF01: LIBYA REPORTS FIRST DEATH DUE TO H1N1, WITH 84 CONFIRMED CASES REF: STATE 00120578 TRIPOLI 00000948 001.2 OF 002	2009-12-03	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI1030	LIBYA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM REF: STATE 109980	2009-12-22	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI106	TRIPOLI VISAS VIPER REPORT: JANUARY 2010	2010-02-09	2011-01-31	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy Tripoli
10AMMAN91	JORDAN: REGIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT - AFGHANISTAN	2010-01-07	2011-01-31	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Amman
05SAOPAULO872	BREAK-UP OF LEBANESE DRUG RING IN BRAZIL REF: SAO PAULO 683	2005-07-22	2011-01-28	SECRET	Consulate Sao Paulo
09STATE86227	EGYPT LEAHY VETTING RESPONSE	2009-08-19	2011-01-28	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Secretary of State
09STATE106226	EGYPT LEAHY VETTING RESPONSE - 382 AND 99204 THRU	2009-10-13	2011-01-28	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Secretary of State
09STATE108736	EGYPT LEAHY VETTING RESPONSE - 99209 THRU 99249 -	2009-10-21	2011-01-28	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Secretary of State

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