R 271210Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4549
INFO FBI WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000190 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA  POST FOR RSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/27/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER LY
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - SPRING 
2009 
 
REF: A. A. 09 CIAWASH 542085 - ALLEGED THREAT BY AL-QA'IDA IN LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB TO KIDNAP FOREIGN TOURIST IN GHAT AND GHADAMIS, LIBYA B. B. 08 CIAWASH 400246 - PLANS OF AL-QA'IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB TO ATTACK THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA C. C. 08 TRIPOLI 120 - EXTREMISM IN EASTERN LIBYA D. D. 09 STATE 13023 - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) SPRING 2009 E. E. 08 TRIPOLI 660 - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) FALL 2008 F. F. 07 TRIPOLI 883 - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) FALL 2007 G. G. 07 TRIPOLI 370 - QADHAFI: "REGAN WAS CRAZY; LIBYA NOW HAS BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. H. H. 07 TRIPOLI 330 - MEMORIES OF 1986 AIR STRIKE REVERBERATE AND COMPLICATE CURRENT AGENDA I. I. 05 TRIPOLI 255 - ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION AT USLO TRIPOLI CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(SBU) The following Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) - Spring 2009 is submitted by US Embassy Tripoli via reftel format:

2.(U) POLITICAL VIOLENCE I. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS: A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS? 

Yes, Sunni Muslims (who are the vast majority in Libya) could be mobilized as occurred in the February 2006 demonstrations at the Italian Consulate in Benghazi in reaction to the Danish cartoons controversy. Libyan law criminalizes unauthorized demonstrations and only grants permission to demonstrations in line with revolutionary ideals. Although organized, these demonstrations can get out of hand. i. 

HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? 

The Government of Libya annually commemorates with small rallies of military personnel the June 11, 1971 anniversary of the evacuation of all U.S. personnel from the former Wheelus Air Force Base and the official handover of the base to the GOL. Previous Anti-American demonstrations included: Unlike previous years, the April 2008 anniversary of the 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi (Operation El Dorado Canyon) was relatively low-key, marked only by a speech by Muammar al-Qadhafi. On April 15, 2007 the GOL held large, but peaceful rallies in the main square of Tripoli, the center of Benghazi and the Qadhafi compound to commemorate the 21st anniversary of the 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi (Operation El Dorado Canyon). The rallies were broadcast on Libyan television and included speeches by government officials and footage of military and youth groups performing tactical demonstrations of rappelling down buildings and engaging in hand to hand combat. This anniversary is commemorated annually. The 20th anniversary in 2006 was commemorated with an April 15 concert held at the bombing site on Qadhafi's Bab al Azizia compound in Tripoli. 10/18/2005: Anti-American demonstration at the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel, then location of the US Embassy. Approximately 100 demonstrators protested President Bush's comments on October 17, 2006 concerning the case of Bulgarian medics accused of deliberately infecting Benghazi children with the AIDS virus. 

NOTE: On Sunday, May 18, 2008, Embassy Tripoli ceased operations at the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel. END NOTE 

Spring 2005: Anti-American demonstration at the United Nations Tripoli Headquarters. This demonstration was sponsored by the GOL and was against U.S. foreign policy in Iraq. There were fewer than 500 protesters present and the event was peaceful and non-violent. There were no reported incidents. ii. 

HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? Yes, as noted in section i above. iii. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? 

Most demonstrations are under 500 people and strictly controlled by the government, with the notable exception of the past years' April 15 demonstrations which numbered in the thousands across Libya commemorating the 1986 air strikes by the United States in response to the Libyan-backed terrorist bombing of the Berlin LaBelle nightclub, other demonstrations number fewer than five hundred people. 

iv. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC ISSUES? 

U.S. foreign policy initiatives are typically the catalyst for anti-American demonstrations. There have been demonstrations on the anniversary of military actions undertaken by the U.S. against Libya in 1986. In the past, demonstrations appeared to focus on the U.S. position on the Bulgarian medic's case, where Libyan courts had imposed death sentences on several Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian Doctor accused of having infected over 400 children with the HIV/AIDS virus. The medics were subsequently released in July 2007. 

¶B. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 

Demonstrations are generally peaceful, non-violent, and GOL-sponsored. A February 2006 government-sponsored demonstration at the Italian Consulate in Benghazi, in response to the Danish Cartoon controversy, turned tragically violent when security forces opened fire on a mob element that broke away from the main group and set fire to the building. Official reports claimed eleven casualties. Unofficial death toll numbers, which cannot be confirmed, were significantly higher. Follow-on violence damaged civil facilities in several Eastern Libyan towns, including a police station. 

i. HAVE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? 

No. ii. HAVE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? No. C. HAVE ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? 

Demonstrations have been planned, but the GOL has not allowed them to take place. 

i. HAVE ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 

No. 

ii. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION? 

The GOL has not allowed anti-government demonstrations. 

iii. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 

The GOL may at times use crowd-control, up to and including lethal force, to prevent demonstrations. Demonstrators are generally peaceful, but can include rock throwing. 

iv. HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY? 

No demonstrations have resulted in damage to USG property. 

II. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS: 

¶A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS). 

No. The GOL is actively involved in trying to find a peaceful settlement in Darfur and to prevent violence from spilling over to Chad and The Central African Republic. 

¶B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? N/A C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? N/A D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? No. III. (S/NF) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED? 

No. The US Embassy has been instructed by the GOL that all physical and personnel security arrangements will be coordinated through the Libyan External Security Organization (Libyan Intelligence). The ESO is responsible for all 83 foreign diplomatic facilities in Tripoli. The RSO has been unable to formally assess the host nation's response capabilities. Through direct observation of GOL assets deployed to the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel, CMR Annex, and the Villa compound Annex in support of US Embassy Tripoli operations and visiting dignitaries, the RSO has determined that the Libyan government has a multi-agency response capability which appears to lack common doctrine, equipment, and training capability. On 02/01/2007, ESO officers interdicted two males observed taking pictures of the Villa Annex. There was an altercation which the ESO officers did not effectively and rapidly contain. The ESO security detail stationed at the Villa Annex routinely consists of two vehicles with two armed and two unarmed ESO officers, and one marked traffic police vehicle with two armed officers. 

¶B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. 

From 2005 through May 2008 the RSO has provided limited security training to the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel security staff, some of whom are ESO officers, in support of US Embassy physical security requirements. An ATA assessment team traveled to post in March 2008. ATA is scheduled to provide 5 training courses to host government law enforcement and security starting March 2009 through September 2009. The ATA training in March 2009 may be postponed because of Libya's sensitivity to USG vetting requirements of its law enforcement and security personnel. 

¶C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES? Yes. D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? 

The ESO is professional and capable in deterring terrorist actions. The Director of External Intelligence has stated to various Mission officials on separate occasions that he believes his service has a 95 per cent success rate in deterring acts of terrorism. However, in the wake of terrorist attacks over the past 12 months in Algeria, Libyan security officials have acknowledged their concerns about potential terrorist incursions across Libya's western borders and an increasing likelihood of terrorist attacks in Libya. Libyan Intelligence works effectively with other countries to counter terrorism. The Director of External Intelligence advised the Charge in January 2007 that his service worked closely with the Tunisian service to thwart a significant terrorist attack in Tunisia. Their strength seems to be using intelligence to deter acts of terrorism. Their ability to counter an attack that has already begun is less apparent because of the lack of common doctrine, equipment, and training. 

¶E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? As pertains to intelligence sharing, yes. As pertains to security support and repeated requests for assistance, no. Dating back to February 2005, the ESO has not responded to RSO requests to discuss a counter-assault response plan. The ESO is the lead agency for the security of all foreign missions but limits post security officers to contact with one ESO liaison individual. As a result, post's security-related requests, made through the RSO's designated ESO liaison, are often long delayed or appear to have been forgotten completely. F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? Yes. In July 2007, Libyan security forces dismantled a network in eastern Libya that was sending volunteer fighters to Algeria and Iraq and was plotting attacks against Libyan security targets using stockpiled explosives. The operation resulted in the arrest of over 100 individuals. G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY? AS of February 1, 2009, RSO has been directed to coordinate all security related issues with the Office of International Relations and Cooperation for Public Security. This new procedure and contact has expedited GOL's response to Embassy security-related issues. After numerous request through official channels over the past nine months for additional security personnel, the GOL has assigned a QRF for the Villa Compound and CMR Annex. H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR) Based on knowledge and experience, the RSO would rate overall airport security as average. I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) Based on knowledge and experience, the RSO would rate the Customs and Immigration Control agencies as below average. Officials do appear to effectively utilize a computerized lookout system for arrivals and departure control at Tripoli International Airport. With respect to land borders, the major issues lie in the South, where controls are thought to be ineffective. USG-sponsored ATA and EXBS training missions planned for FY09 will provide RSO with a more complete picture of host government capacities. J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE;INEFFECTIVE) Ineffective. The ESO has in the past advised US Embassy management that they believe this is a vulnerable area and one which they readily admit they cannot control. Libya also has a significant problem in dealing with illegal migration along its Southern border.

3.(U) INDIGENOUS TERRORISM I. (S/NF) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS: A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN COUNTRY? Yes. B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. AL'JAMA'A AL ISLAMIYA AL-MUQATALA (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group/LIFG). In November 2007, the LIFG officially announced that they had merged with Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is not known whether there are currently active operational LIFG or Al-Qa'ida cells in Libya. The presence in Libya of Libyans who fought in the Iraq jihad and returned to Libya may increase the threat against U.S. interests and personnel in Libya. AQIM has been active and successful in recruiting Libyan extremists, many of a young age, to join the ranks of the AQIM and then undergo terrorist training in neighboring Algeria. C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT LETHAL ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? No. D. WERE THERE ANY OTHER ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS? No. E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? No. F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR U.S.- RELATED TARGETS? No. G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? No, they operate country-wide, though mostly in Eastern regions. 

¶H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S.DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? 

No. 

II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS: A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? 

No. 

¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. N/A C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? 

No. 

¶D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? 

No.

 ¶E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE ATTACKS? 

No.

4.(U) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM I. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS: A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PLEASE PROVIDE NAMES. In 2005, Libya provided assurances to the USG reiterating its renunciation of the use of state-sponsored terrorism as a political adjunct. There may be dormant individuals affiliated with Palestinian rejectionist groups such as the PFLP-GC and the ANO domiciled in Libya. There are Al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) members and Libyans who fought in the Iraq jihad present in Libya. 

¶B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL? 

Palestinian rejectionist group members are residual settled members from the time of Libya's support to these groups. They are not operationally active. AQIM has been active and successful in recruiting Libyan extremists, many of a young age, to join the ranks of the AQIM and then undergo terrorist training in neighboring Algeria. 

¶C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 

Generally speaking, no. However, undoubtedly, there are factions within the Libyan government opposed to the reestablishment of relations between the U.S. and Libya who may be sympathetic to Palestinian rejectionist groups, but not sympathetic to Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQIM) or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The GOL has arrested Al-Qa'ida members in the past year and reiterated its renunciation of terrorism. The GOL views extremists operating under a religious banner as a serious potential threat to the regime and have demonstrated resolve against Al-Qa'ida and its surrogates. 

¶D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS? 

No, The GOL does not allow independent NGOs. It is not likely that support for such groups exist. 

¶E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 

The ESO has indicated to post officers that they have infiltrated several religious communities (mosques) in an attempt to extinguish any anti-government sentiment. The general trend in the region has also seen migration of hard core believers to Iraq. Recent indications suggest a shift to AQIM in Sahelian Africa. Iraqi Sunni groups have surfaced over the last year that appear to be in a dialogue with the Libyan Revolutionary Committees Organization (REVCOM) and other senior regime elements, dialogue that would have required the support of the Libyan leadership to occur. The nature of this dialogue is unclear. 

¶F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET.AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS? 

Post does not have the capability to fully assess the type of presence, if any, of any such groups and unable to provide a measurable response to this question, based on its present capabilities to determine this particular threat. These particular groups are not well-positioned to penetrate the mission. Post adds that there is a Russian and Chinese presence in-country, who are active in the community. Iranian and Sudanese intelligence services are present in Libya. They are not well positioned to perpetuate attacks against the U.S. presence. The host government is well-known for its past acts of anti-American terrorism, but following its renunciation of terrorism and subsequent removal from the state sponsors list, the present aggressive posture of its intelligence agencies toward the US presence seems to be focused on information gathering. 

¶G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS? 

Libya has terminated its weapons of mass destruction program and U.S. scientific observers are monitoring the progress of other Libyan programs, such as their chemical, biological and ballistic weapons programs. Small arms and ammunition are typically difficult to obtain in Libya. One area of concern, however, is in the East, in the desert battlefields of WWII, where the indigenous population searches for buried ordinance for cooking and fishing purposes. Vast minefields on the Southern and Eastern borders are thought to be culled by smugglers who sell the explosives to rebel groups in the Sahel region. Jihadist cells that have been disrupted have also used this as a source of explosives. The GOL has difficulty controlling its southern border. As a result there is a problem with the smuggling of weapons and drugs.

5.(U) Point of contact for this report is RSO Tripoli Jim Eisenhut; Mobile: xxxxxxxxxxxx; Unclassified Email: Eisenhutjp@state.gov; Classified Email: xxxxxxxxxxxx CRETZ