Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04MADRID2215, AZNAR KEPT UNDER WRAPS IN EU PARLIAMENT ELECTION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04MADRID2215.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04MADRID2215 | 2004-06-14 12:12 | 2010-12-03 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002215
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SP
SUBJECT: AZNAR KEPT UNDER WRAPS IN EU PARLIAMENT ELECTION
CAMPAIGN CENTERED ON IRAQ, US TIES
Classified By: Polcouns Kathleen Fitzpatrick, per 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
¶1. (C) Jose Maria Aznar did not participate in the Popular
Party's campaign for the June 13 EU parliamentary election.
With the Socialists making the war in Iraq and distancing
Spanish foreign policy from the US their central campaign
issues, Popular Party leaders decided that Aznar was too
radioactive to help in the campaign. Aznar insiders tell us
that Aznar recognized this as well, but is confident time
will ultimately vindicate his policies. Many in the PP
regarded Aznar's May visit to the US, which included a
private meeting with President Bush, as inopportune. They
believe the visit give the Socialists ammunition in their
efforts to portray the PP as a tool of the US. Following his
US visit, Aznar avoided the media and focused on presiding
over the PP think tank (FAES) and learning English in
preparation for speaking engagements. On June 13, the
Popular Party succeeded in beating expectations and came
within two points of the Socialists in the EU election. End
Summary.
Aznar Radioactive
¶2. (C) Aznar's longtime associate and former State Secretary
for Communication Alfredo Timmermans told us recently that
Aznar's decision to play no public role in the June 13 EU
parliament election campaign was his choice, but that it also
reflected the preference of PP leaders. The Socialists
(PSOE) sought a repeat of their March 14 surprise election
victory and played up themes that had worked for them,
notably opposition to the Iraq war and Aznar's close
relations with the US. Timmermans said that Aznar was
fully aware that he was politically radioactive and, as a
result, kept a low profile. His only public activities were
to appear at signings of new his book recounting his years in
office. (Timmermans noted sales are going well and the book
is now in its second printing.)
"Photo of the Azores"
¶3. (C) A Socialist refrain from the EU parliament election
campaign was the need to correct "the photo of the Azores."
To them, the March 2003 Azores summit stands for committing
Spain to an Iraq conflict that the Spanish public wanted no
part of and for allying with the US instead of France and
Germany.
¶4. (C) For this reason, there was unease in the PP when
Aznar visited the US in May 2004, only weeks after stepping
down from office. While PP leaders stated that Aznar had a
right to travel where he wished, many, including Aznar
loyalists, felt that given the EU election Aznar should have
postponed the trip until after June 13. Timmermans told us
that many in the PP wanted Aznar to "stay home and say
nothing." Timmermans said Aznar understood that he is, for
the present, a divisive figure but that he is confident time
will vindicate his policies toward Iraq and the US.
Timmermans said Aznar was buoyed by the warm reception he
received in the US and, in particular, by his meeting with
President Bush. Timmermans contrasted this warmth with the
reticence Aznar has encountered from some in the Popular
Party since March 14.
Aznar's Messages to the US
¶5. (C) Timmermans noted that Aznar had expressed concern to
President Bush that the March 11 Madrid terrorist attacks had
sent a message to terrorists that they can influence
elections. Aznar urged vigilance in advance of US
elections. Aznar believes al Qaeda inspired terrorists
might also target countries like Italy where public opinion
is vulnerable. Timmermans said Aznar believes the US has
to brace for continued bad news from Iraq and came away with
the impression that some US observers may be too optimistic
about the medium term outlook. Timmermans said an election
defeat by President Bush in November would be read, rightly
or wrongly, in Spain as a defeat for the Popular Party and
would give the Socialists a boost.
¶6. (C) Timmermans said the PP, Aznar included, continues to
be "astonished" by the chain of events from the March 11
terrorist attacks to surprise election defeat on March 14.
Many Popular Party members, Timmermans said, blame Aznar's
Iraq policy for the defeat and believe Aznar gambled with the
party's future on Iraq and lost. Like other Spaniards (80
percent according to some polls), most PP members were not
sorry to see the Spanish troops come home, Timmermans said.
¶7. (C) Timmermans underlined that Aznar remains unyielding
in his beliefs. Aznar will continue to support the Iraq war
and say publicly that the Madrid terrorist attacks on March
11 brought the Socialists to power. Timmermans (speaking
before June 13) noted that President Zapatero is still in the
honeymoon phase and thus the PSOE would have an important
electoral advantage. Zapatero has not had to make any
unpopular decisions and his one major decision ) to pull the
troops out ) was highly popular. Timmermans said that all
of Zapatero's decisions are taken with one idea in mind:
doing what is popular.
Aznar's Future
¶8. (C) Aznar is confident that in the longer term, he will
be vindicated, Timmermans said. However, the current period
is a difficult one for the PP and for Aznar personally. In
the coming year, Aznar intends to travel frequently to the
US. While based in Spain, he will make speeches to US
audiences and teach occasional seminars at Georgetown.
Aznar is working hard on his English and is presiding over
the Popular Party think tank, FAES. Timmermans said Aznar
will make it a point to speak out in favor of the
transatlantic link and the need for close relations with the
United States.
June 13: PP Exceeds Expectations, On Road to Recovery
¶9. (C) Popular Party strategists told us in the run up to
the June 13 election that the PP goal was to keep the race
close. None said that they expected to win, but they did
hope to cut the Socialist margin. Polling had given the
Socialists a 6 to 9 point advantage. The June 13 result was
far tighter: the Socialists won by only two points. PP
leaders regard this as a relative victory. Jorge Moragas,
PP Director for International Affairs, told us that the
result at least succeeded in giving a "shock" to the
over-confidence of the Socialists and is a signal the PP is
on the road to recovery.
MANZANARES