Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05MADRID1604, SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER: VENEZUELA DEAL DESIGNED
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MADRID1604.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05MADRID1604 | 2005-04-26 06:06 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001604
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, WHA/AND AND WHA/CCA
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER: VENEZUELA DEAL DESIGNED
TO SAVE SHIPYARD
Classified By: Charge d,Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Charge April 22,
Minister of Defense Jose Bono said the only reason Spain was
selling military ships to Venezuela was to help troubled Izar
shipyard. Protesting Izar workers had put a lot of pressure
on the Zapatero government, said Bono. He assured Charge
that none of the ships would have offensive capabilities. He
said Spain "is with the U.S." on international security
issues, such as Afghanistan, but it seems the U.S. only
focuses on the problems in the Spain-U.S. relationship. Bono
hopes his May 3 meeting with SecDef Rumsfeld is very positive
and shows Spanish voters the countries' defense relations are
excellent. End summary.
¶2. (C) On the sale to Venezuela, Bono asked Charge not to
pay attention to press accounts of the sale because "every
time the press talks about it we're selling something
different." The opposition Popular Party is interested in
ruining relations between the Zapatero and Bush
administrations and so fuels inaccurate media accounts of the
sale. Spain, said Bono, is selling a total of eight patrol
ships to the Chavez government and 12 transport planes. The
planes will have no armaments and the patrol ships will have
only machine guns. Neither the planes nor the ships will be
used offensively. Charge countered the notion that the USG's
concern about the sale was related to U.S. commercial
interests. The U.S. believed the sale would contribute to
Chavez' military might and political credibility and would
make him more able to destabilize the region and continue his
anti-democratic maneuvers in his own country.
¶3. (C) Bono said that if he spoke English he would have
called Rumsfeld himself to explain why Spain was making this
sale. He said it boiled down to saving the ailing
state-owned shipyard Izar. Izar's workers have been
protesting against Zapatero government, clamoring for a fix
for the company's financial woes. Bono said the Venezuela
sale was one way the Zapatero government could significantly
help Izar. The sale would be Izar's biggest in the last 10
years. Bono added that he had informed Colombian president
Uribe of the sale, and he raised no objections.
¶4. (C) In addition, said Bono, other European countries with
good relations with the U.S. sell military equipment to
Venezuela, such as Sweden. Also, the U.S. does not limit
military sales only to democratic countries -- the U.S. sells
military equipment to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco and
Pakistan.
¶5. (C) Bono said Spain is "with the United States," and has
demonstrated this by deciding to lead a provincial
reconstruction team and forward support base in western
Afghanistan. He noted that even though the Aznar government
wanted to take Spanish troops out of Kosovo, the Zapatero
government has decided to leave them there. He also cited
Spain's troop presence in Haiti as another example of Spain's
willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on international
security matters. When considering how loyal Spain has been
as an ally, the U.S. should also look at the access Spain has
continued to give U.S. troops at Rota and Moron military
bases. "It seems," Bono said, "that we are doing everything
the U.S. wants, but the U.S. still doesn't like what we're
doing."
¶6. (C) Bono said he hopes his visit to Washington will show
the Spanish public that relations with the U.S. are
excellent. "I have to show my clients the trip was worth it,
was very productive" commented Bono. Bono reminded Charge
that he was the only minister to attend the Embassy's
election night party in November. "We would like to be
rewarded for our cooperation with the U.S., not required to
pay a toll," said the minister.
¶7. (C) Turning to the S-80 submarine weapons system
contract, Bono said the Spanish government is nearing a
decision on the deal. He said the two American companies
vying for the deal are well positioned, but French president
Chirac has asked Zapatero to give the contract to a French
company. Bono intimated that the S-80 contract had the
potential to improve U.S.-Spain relations and is "not just a
project to build four submarines," said Bono, "but will
involve future contracts for 35-40 years." If awarded to an
American company, the contract would also increase
interoperability between the Spanish and U.S. navies.
¶8. (C) Bono also said he hoped he could get closure from
Secretary Rumsfeld on the releasability to Spain of the
SIPDIS
Tomahawk missile. Charge mentioned that Embassy had the
impression based on meetings with high-ranking members of the
Spanish military that Spain was undecided about purchasing
the missile if it were made available. "We want the
Tomahawk," said Bono, "I want to be clear on that."
¶9. (C) Comment: Bono is a Socialist Party "baron" whom
Zapatero narrowly beat out in 2000 to lead the party. He is
one of the Socialists' main Catholic conservatives and
remains one of the most popular political figures in Spain.
He thus has considerable influence and popularity if not
lengthy experience with substantive defense issues. And
while the chief of defense is well respected, he defers to
Bono, as do the services.
¶10. (C) Comment continued: Bono took pains to convince us
the only reason Spain was selling military equipment to the
Chavez government was to help ailing Izar. Although saving
Izar is likely the principal reason for the sale, Zapatero's
interest in engaging Chavez is no doubt another goal.
Zapatero believes that by engaging Chavez, he can gain some
influence over him. Bono's remarks also show he believes
Spain has not gotten enough credit from the U.S. for its
cooperation in Afghanistan and other areas, and that the U.S.
government is focusing only on the problem areas in our
relations with Spain, not on the positives.
MANZANARES