Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BERN141, SWISS COUNTERTERRORISM OVERVIEW - SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER REF: A. BERN 100 B. BERN 10 C. 2005 BERN 1865
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BERN141.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BERN141 | 2006-01-20 16:04 | 2011-01-11 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bern |
VZCZCXRO7442
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSW #0141/01 0201653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201653Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1431
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2436
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERN 000141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EB, EUR/AGS
FBI FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
TREASURY FOR OFAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: PTER PARM ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS COUNTERTERRORISM OVERVIEW - SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER REF: A. BERN 100 B. BERN 10 C. 2005 BERN 1865
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Eric Sandberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d
1.(C) Summary: Switzerland and Liechtenstein are considered low-threat target for terrorist attacks, but Bern acknowledges that Islamist groups could use the country as a transit point, logistics center, or haven for terrorist finances. While violent crime in both countries is relatively low, officials remain concerned about international organized criminal groups and extreme right-wing and left-wing political elements who occasionally mobilize for demonstrations surrounding major events, such as the annual World Economic Forum in Davos. Swiss officials maintain that there are few Islamic extremists in the country, but a small number of arrests in the past two years suggests there may be more under the surface. Bilateral law enforcement and intelligence cooperation is improving, but at a gradual pace; Swiss leaders insist that they can address the threat with little outside assistance. The Swiss media and individual members of Parliament have placed a greater focus on alleged USG wrongdoings in the War on Terror than on the terrorist threat itself. As for Liechtenstein, officials work very cooperatively with USG counterparts, as they seek to ameliorate their reputation as a money-laundering center. End Summary.
Anti-Terror Measures
--------------------
2.(U) Switzerland implemented UN sanctions even prior to becoming a full member in 2002. Along with UN lists, the Swiss Economic and Finance ministries have drawn up their own list of around 44 individuals and entities connected with international terrorism (Al-Qaeda) or its financing. Swiss authorities have thus far blocked about 82 accounts totaling $28 million (SFr 34 million) from individuals or companies linked to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda under UN resolutions. The Swiss Federal Prosecutor also froze separately 41 accounts representing about $28 million (SFr 34 millions) on the ground they were related to terrorist financing. Swiss officials estimate significant overlap between the US and UN lists. Switzerland signed and ratified all of the 12 UN anti-terrorism conventions as of September 2003.
3.(U) For its part, Liechtenstein has frozen about $145 thousand in Taliban/Al-Qaeda assets under UNSC Resolution 1267. The principality has taken notable strides to combat money laundering and other illegal activity since 1999; it joined the Egmont Group in 2001, signed a mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States in 2003, and was FATF certified that same year. Liechtenstein has also ratified all of the relevant UN conventions.
Bilateral Cooperation
---------------------
4.(C) Following 9/11, the Swiss agreed to sign an operative working agreement (OWA) with the USG permitting intensified information sharing on Al-Qaeda and allowing an FBI agent to sit in the Federal Criminal Police Counterterrorism Unit. We are in the final stages of negotiating a broadened OWA to allow joint investigations on counterterrorism matters. As forthcoming as some contacts are, the Swiss law enforcement community in general remain reluctant to open up to the United States. The sentiment was expressed best by Justice Minister Blocher to the Ambassador. Blocher said that Switzerland shared America’s counterterrorism goals; Switzerland will worry about Switzerland, and the U.S. can worry about the rest of the world. The least cooperative Swiss agency (with us and with other Swiss agencies) is the Federal Service for Analysis and Prevention (DAP) -- the internal intelligence service. The external service, under the Swiss Department of Defense, is more cooperative.
5.(C) In many ways, Liechtenstein officials are a model of what we wish the Swiss would become. Shocked by the international notoriety it earned in the 1990s, officials in the tiny principality decided to join FATF and cooperate with partners. The MLAT it signed with the United States in 2003 BERN 00000141 002 OF 004 was the first of its kind for Liechtenstein. They make as much use of it as do our law enforcement agencies.
Significant counterterrorism investigations
-------------------------------------------
6.(C) Swiss prosecutors have launched several investigations of suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Switzerland. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Muslims in Switzerland ----------------------
7.(U) The Muslim population in Switzerland has grown rapidly BERN 00000141 003.2 OF 004 in the last two decades, now reaching around 310,000, or 4.3 percenQ the Swiss population. The majority of these, roughly 200,000, come from former Yugoslavia and tend to be moderate or secular in their views. Another 70,000 are of Turkish background, have long been in Switzerland, and are also moderate. Only the North African population, largely from Morocco, are seen as a possible source of Islamic extremism. There are no Islamic political parties in Switzerland; the Muslim population is divided along ethnic lines. There are only two mosque buildings in SwitzerlandQn Zurich aQeneva), but over a hundred makeshift Islamic centers operate.
8.(SBU) While Swiss authorities recognize that the Muslim population could contain extremists, they rate the threat from right-wing Neo-nazis and left-wing Swiss political extremists as being much higher. Swiss authorities believe that those Islamists present consider the country a “refuge” rather than a “place to carry out operations.” A Special Report on Extremism issued late last year maintains that almost all radical groups represented in Switzerland are Sunni organizations whose primary goals are the establishment of Islamic governments in their homelands. The principal groups in this category are En Nahdha, the Tunisian Islamic Front, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Hizbollah and Al-Takfir wal-Hijra.
9.(C) The best known Islamists in Switzerland are the Ramadans, Tariq and Hani, of the Islamic Center in Geneva. Tariq Ramadan, formerly a professor of philosophy and grandson of Muslim Brotherhood found Hassan al-Bana, is well-known throughout Europe. He is sometimes hailed as a moderate, at other times attacked as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, putting a palatable front to fundamentalist activities. Offered a teaching position at Notre Dame University in 2004, his visa was revoked by DHS, and he withdrew a subsequent application. The UK Government has included Ramadan in an advisory body to assist in their outreach efforts with its Muslim minority.
10.(U) Hani Ramadan was suspended from his duties as a public school teacher in the fall of 2002, following the publication of an article in the French newspaper “Le Monde,” in which he spoke out in favor of the stoning of adulterers. He was dismissed in 2003, following an administrative investigation, but he successfully appealed the decision. However, following a second investigation, the Geneva Cantonal Government confirmed Ramadan’s dismissal and removed him from the cantonal payroll in December 2004. In October 2005, the Swiss Justice Ministry denied a work permit to a Turkish Imam invited to work at the Islamic Center in Geneva, due to the Imam’s extremist views.
Swiss Media Push-back on the War on Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -
11.(C) Since the Washington Post claimed in early November 2005 that the United States was operating hidden prisons in Europe, the Swiss media has gone full bore in identifying USG sins, real and imagined. Any news on Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib is guaranteed front-page treatment, whereas Al-Qaeda attacks are relegated to the back pages. Of particular concern is the issue of overflights by alleged CIA charter planes. Italian prosecutors allege that a U.S. military jet traversed Swiss airspace on the day Milan cleric Abu Omar was kidnapped. The Swiss government has repeatedly asked the USG to explain the flight and four charter plane landings at Geneva Airport. Washington has yet to respond.
12.(C) Recently, a Swiss tabloid published a leaked Swiss intelligence report of an intercept of an Egyptian government fax. The Swiss Federal Council has condemned the leak and its subsequent publication, and the government has launched administrative and criminal investigations into the matter. The intercepted Egyptian fax claimed that the Egyptian government knew of 23 Iraqi and Afghani prisoners transferred by the USG to prisons in Romania and other Eastern European countries. Swiss officials apologized to Ambassador Willeford for the leak and for the press’s overreaction to it. The Ambassador cautioned officials that Switzerland’s
BERN 00000141 004 OF 004
obsession with the prisons/overflight matter -- driven in significant measure by Swiss Senator Dick Marty -- risked overwhelming Washington’s perceptions of Switzerland. Marty, acting in his capacity as head of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Justice Commission and not in any official Swiss government capacity, greeted the information cautiously, but criticized the Swiss and other European governments for not disclosing information on the prisoner issue.
Comment -------
13.(C) Comment: Despite being somewhat shaken by attacks in London and Madrid, the Swiss internal security service continues to assess that Switzerland is relatively safe and that there is no evidence yet of any activity beyond logistical support for Islamic extremists. Swiss opinion leaders among the Parliament and media exhibit little evident concern about the terrorist threat to Switzerland, perhaps contributing to their tendency to focus their criticism on the USG reaction, rather than the initial threat itself. Embassy engagement with Swiss counterparts, reinforced by senior-level visits by USG officials, are helping to move the Swiss to be more forthcoming on information sharing and joint investigations. Absent a direct attack on Swiss interests, however, the process is liable to move very gradually. End comment. Willeford