Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MADRID76, SPAIN/VENEZUELA: REACTION TO DENIAL OF LICENSE FOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MADRID76.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MADRID76 | 2006-01-12 17:05 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
121706Z Jan 06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000076
SIPDIS
FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR EUR A/S FRIED AND NSC DAN FISK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/VENEZUELA: REACTION TO DENIAL OF LICENSE FOR
TECH TRANSFER
REF: STATE 5253
Classified By: DCM Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador met with Foreign Minister
Miguel Angel Moratinos on January 12 to advise him of the USG
decision to deny the Spanish technology transfer license
request related to the sale of Spanish aircraft to the
Venezuelan government. Moratinos expressed frustration,
saying it would be seen as a "punitive action" by the USG
against Spain and would provide a field day for the
opposition and the media. He said he expected a negative
reaction by President Zapatero to the news. Moratinos
complained that the USG did not recognize Spain's positive
steps, but only focused on negative episodes in the
relationship; he urged a clear "positive signal" that the USG
wanted good relations with Spain. The Ambassador reviewed
the USG's clear, consistent, and frequent messages to Spain
regarding its sale of ships and planes to Venezuela. He said
the USG also desired better relations and had made a
concerted effort to work with Spain in Latin America, as
evidenced by the upcoming visit of WHA A/S Shannon. The
Ambassador met briefly with President Zapatero and Moratinos
at a representational event later in the day; both appeared
to have accepted the news and were focused on how to deal
with it in the media. Comment: It would be useful from
Embassy Madrid's perspective to again demonstrate our
interest in good relations with Spain, perhaps by arranging a
meeting for Moratinos with the Secretary when Moratinos is in
the U.S. in May for the U.S.-Spain Council meeting in
Florida. End Comment.
¶2. (C) Separately, Moratinos discussed his impressions of
Bolivian president-elect Evo Morales, describing him as
honest, but inexperienced and caught in "a bear hug" by
Castro and Chavez. He said he had encouraged Morales to work
with the USG. For his part Morales asked that Spain convey
two messages to the USG: A) that the USG not imply that he is
connected to narcotraffickers (or by association with
terrorists) because of his support for the coca growers, and
B) that the USG give Morales "room for maneuver" with the IMF
and World Bank. End Summary.
¶3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, relayed reftel
points to FM Moratinos and Deputy FM Bernardino Leon, telling
Moratinos that it was not the USG's intent to make the denial
of the licenses public. The Ambassador explained that the
USG had carefully reviewed the application for a license by
EADS CASA and was denying the application consistent with USG
concerns regarding the transfer of such technology to
Venezuela, not as a swipe against the Spanish government. He
told Moratinos that he would similarly inform Minister of
Defense Jose Bono and EADS CASA Chairman Sanz.
¶4. (C) Moratinos asked whether the USG decision could be
reversed. The Ambassador said that it was a firm decision
that could only be revisited if Venezuela changed its present
course, noting that the USG was following the same policy
with respect to similar applications by other countries for
authorization to transfer technology to Venezuela, as we had
recently explained to Spanish officials. Moratinos said the
denial of the applications was unfortunate, given the Spanish
government's approval to EADS CASA to continue with the sale
and expressed concern about how this decision would affect
Spanish commercial interests. The Ambassador ventured that
EADS CASA would probably not be unduly harmed, given the
company's significant business interests elsewhere, but that
that issue was for the company to resolve.
¶5. (C) Moratinos turned to the political impact of the USG
decision, saying it would be portrayed as a punitive action
by the USG against the Zapatero government and would give the
opposition and the media platform to cast Zapatero as inept
in his handling of relations with the U.S. Moratinos said he
would inform Zapatero immediately and expected him to react
negatively to the news. He said he would inform the
Ambassador of Zapatero's reaction.
¶6. (C) In a frustrated tone, Moratinos asked what the USG
expected of Spain. He said 2006 was a crucial year for the
Zapatero government and that they had to get bilateral
relations on track because the U.S. would be absorbed by
political campaigning in 2007. Moratinos said Spain desired
"clear signals" from the USG that bilateral relations had
improved, but saw only "punitive signals," including this
decision to deny the technology transfer to Venezuela. He
said the USG and Spain should be establishing joint
objectives in democracy promotion in Venezuela rather than
arguing over arms sales. "We are the eighth largest power in
the world, but (the USG) treats us like a fifth-rate power.
We have no indication that there could be a visit by
Secretary Rice or other high level attention. We want to
SIPDIS
work with you, but need a minimal political signal that you
want to work with us. We need to demonstrate that the
bilateral relations are on track and are not just about what
we are doing in Venezuela and Cuba."
¶7. (C) The Ambassador responded that there could be no
surprise on the part of Moratinos or other Spanish leaders
regarding the USG's decision on the EADS CASA application.
From the beginning, the USG message on the Spanish sales to
Venezuela had been clear, consistent, and frequent. Spain
had made its decision in spite of our objections.
Nevertheless, said the Ambassador, the USG also wished to put
this issue behind us and move forward on a common agenda, as
evidenced by the upcoming visits of WHA A/S Tom Shannon and
Senator Mel Martinez. He also noted Spanish Vice President
de la Vega's expression of interest in visiting the U.S.,
which the Embassy supported. The Ambassador said he agreed
with Moratinos that we could work together to make 2006 a
good year for the bilateral relationship. At this point,
Deputy FM Leon noted that former President Felipe Gonzalez
planned to visit Venezuela at the end of January to talk to
both Chavez and the opposition as part of Spain's democracy
promotion efforts.
¶8. (C) Hours later, the Ambassador met with President
Zapatero and Moratinos in an informal pull-aside at a Royal
Palace reception. They seemed to have digested the news well
and were focused on media portrayal of the decision. The
Ambassador assured them that the USG was not interested in a
negative portrayal of this episode in the media viz-a-viz
U.S.-Spain bilateral relations.
//EVO MORALES VISIT//
¶9. (C) On the visit of Bolivian president-elect Evo Morales,
Moratinos shared his impression that Morales' strengths were
his "honesty and his conscience." However, Moratinos also
described Morales as uninformed and inexperienced. Morales
told Spanish interlocutors that he desired a special
relationship with Spain and did not want to rely solely on
Venezuela and Cuba, but Moratinos expressed concern that
Castro and Chavez' "bear hug" of Morales would continue to
have a negative effect. Moratinos said he had urged Morales
to stop aggravating the USG. According to Moratinos, Morales
asked that Spain convey two messages to the USG on his behalf:
-- Do not implicate him with narcotics trafficking (or by
extension narco terrorism) simply because of his support for
coca cultivation; and,
-- Give him room for manuever with the IMF and the World Bank.
//COMMENT//
¶10. (C) Given President Zapatero's measured response, it
appears that Moratinos overcame his frustration and presented
the issue to Zapatero is a straightforward manner. Overall,
Moratinos has been a positive influence throughout this
episode, despite having to (again) play the role of the loser
in an internal struggle with Bono. Moratinos consistently
scores near the bottom in Spanish public opinion polls while
Bono is among the most popular figures in the cabinet. This
may be due in part to the fact that Bono is a professional
politician, while Moratinos is a career diplomat with little
flair for the spotlight. From our viewpoint, it makes sense
to reinforce Moratinos' positive attitudes, perhaps through a
meeting with the Secretary during Moratinos' visit to the
U.S. in May to participate in the U.S.-Spain Council meetings
in Florida.
AGUIRRE