Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LAPAZ906, THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3)
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LAPAZ906.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LAPAZ906 | 2006-03-31 13:01 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
VZCZCXRO8861
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0906/01 0901326
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311326Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8688
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5747
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3025
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6897
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4134
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1447
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1390
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3701
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4087
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8623
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000906
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR
SUBJECT: THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3)
REF: A. LA PAZ 00691
¶B. LA PAZ 00600
¶C. LA PAZ 00406
Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales' circle of Bolivian
intellectual advisers occupies half of the President's
Cabinet, including the top three positions: the Vice
President, the Minister of the Presidency, and the Minister
of Sustainable Development and Planning. While the
intellectuals have more influence over the President than his
domestic political advisers, they also compete with Cuban and
Venezuelan advisers for Morales' confidence. The second tier
of intellectual advisers is critical for implementing the
government's policies, including the Cuban-sponsored
education program, negotiating new contracts with
international hydrocarbons companies, and carrying out land
reform. This cable is part two in a three-part series on how
Morales has structured his advisory system. End summary.
--------------------------------------------
First Tier of Bolivian Intellectual Advisers
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The first tier of President Evo Morales' domestic
intellectual advisers is headed by Vice President Alvaro
Garcia Linera, followed by Minister of the Presidency Juan
Ramon Quintana and Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas. All
three were professors at the Greater University of San Andres
(UMSA) before joining the Morales administration. Morales'
intellectual advisers have more sway with the President than
do his domestic political advisers (SEPTEL), but they also
compete with Cuban and Venezuelan consultants for Morales'
confidence. They have pursued their own agenda at times,
which has angered the President in the past and could push
him to rely more on his foreign advisers if these practices
continue.
--------------------
Alvaro Garcia Linera
--------------------
¶3. (C) Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera is the gatekeeper
for Bolivian advisers and moderates and adds intellectual
spin to the President's vision. Nonetheless, Garcia Linera
is a committed, even devout ideologue and in the past has
criticized Morales' lack of discipline to leftist ideals
(NFI). At odds with Morales on several occasions, including
disagreeing over Cabinet picks, the Vice President has
struggled to find his niche in the Morales administration and
may have found it as the MAS go-to-person for the Constituent
Assembly.
¶4. (C) Garcia Linera, ambitious in his own right, was the
puivotal political orchestrator of the Constituent Assembly
(CA) process. Garcia Linera, who views the CA as the
ultimate forum for reforming the state, is working to build
his reputation as the expert on the issue. He was a gifted
negotiator during the congressional debate over the convoking
CA legislation. Embassy contacts say that he was key in
talking down radical proposals offered by the MAS and
opposition members, and in forging the final consensus. They
also note that he had impressive patience and focus during
the highly charged negotiations. (Comment: Some observers
say that Garcia Linera has presisdential aspirations; if so,
recent precedents suggest that the vice presidency is a good
place to be. It also suggests that he may be competing with
Morales for public support. End comment.)
¶5. (C) A sharp intellectual steeped in largely discredited
political, philosophical, and economic theory, Garcia Linera
appears to see Bolivia through the prism of the French
revolution. In a recent press interview, he said that he
sees himself as the last Jacobin and Evo as Robbespierre.
(Comment: The Jacobins and Robbespierre were notorious for
their reign of terror. They arrested and executed political
LA PAZ 00000906 002 OF 003
adversaries and allies alike and ultimately met their demise
from the same instrument used to execute the opposition: the
guillotine. To extend the analogy, many pundits have argued
that Morales may meet his own demise at the hands of
protestors, just as he was a force during protests to oust
Presidents Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa. End
comment.)
-------------------
Juan Ramon Quintana
-------------------
¶6. (C) Embassy contacts have said that Minister of the
Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana is responsible for
intelligence and military issues, and for coordinating
Venezuelan and Cuban support. Garcia Linera brought Quintana
into his position.
¶7. (S//NF) Quintana is a disgruntled former military officer
who was fired from his position in the Ministry of Defense in
2000 during the Banzer regime. He long suspected that the US
was behind his firing, a suspicion that has some merit, and
became stridently anti-U.S. as a result. Quintana, upon
assuming his current duties, was responsible for the recent
removal of 29 flag-rank members of the armed forces, most of
whom were cooperating with the United States. The Minister
also has been seeking out other officers who have had contact
with U.S. officials, probably with the intent to fire them.
¶8. (S//NF) Quintana's disdain for the United States is so
deep that he withheld from Morales sensitive information
passed to him by U.S. intelligence agencies to prevent the
President from knowing that the Americans were helping him.
The already suspicious Morales is aware that Quintana
withheld information, and sensitive reporting indicates that
he is monitoring the Minister. Morales may choose to
sideline the Minister if the behavior continues. Sensitive
reporting also indicates that Quintana has had other problems
with Morales for paying more attention to getting jobs for
his friends than focusing on his substantive duties,
something that could further aggravate the relationship.
---------------
Carlos Villegas
---------------
¶9. (C) Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas oversees all
economic coordination and decisionmaking. The Minister of
Finance reports to Villegas, and not to Morales. Villegas,
an economics professor from UMSA, is steeped in out-dated
socialist economic theories and has yet to accept the
practical realities of a globalized economy. (REF C)
¶10. (C) While Villegas may be beginning to understand the
real impact of free trade on job creation, he appears to
believe that markets in Venezuela and China serve as
alternatives to U.S. markets. He has told Bolivian exporters
to seek markets outside the United States, unconvinced that
the U.S. is crucial to their trade (REF B). He recently
returned from Venezuela after negotiating an agreement for
Venezuela to buy Bolivian soy. Additionally, he has
regularly antagonized other businesses, telling them that the
President's Dignity Tariff, a new lower price mean to provide
cheap electricity to Bolivians is a done deal, remarking that
the private sector should either get on board or suffer.
(REF A).
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Second Tier of Bolivian Intellectuals Implementing Policy
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶11. (C) The second tier of intellectual advisers includes
Minister of Hydrocarbons Andres Soliz Rada, Minister of
Agriculture Hugo Salvatierra, Minister of Education Feliz
Patzi, Minister of Finance Luis Arce Catacora, and the palace
spokesman Alex Contreras. They appear to take instructions
from the top tier and from Morales himself. At times they
LA PAZ 00000906 003 OF 003
appear more like political "operators" (SEPTEL) doing the
President's bidding. In contrast to the political operators,
however, the second tier of intellectuals does not tend to
engage in strong-arming or undermining the opposition. They
appear to focus almost exclusively on implementing
policy--including coordinating the Cuban doctors program and
pursuing land reform. (Comment: Soliz, Salvatierra, and
Patzi are all associated with UMSA.)
--------------------------------
And then there's FM Choquehuanca
--------------------------------
¶12. (C) While Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca Cespedes is
considered one of Morales' most prominent intellectuals after
Garcia Linera and Villegas, he is more of a figurehead who
represents the indigenous face of Bolivia. He appears to be
mostly hot air with no real substantive advisory role in
traditional foreign policy issues, except for possibly
maintaining contacts with European NGOs. An overly eccentric
official, who an Embassy adviser says has a sulfuric
relationship with most people, Choquehuanca's curious
statements about his ancestors living for over 200 years and
replacing milk with coca in a school nutrition program have
drawn criticisms. Morales' largely discredited arch-nemesis
Felipe Quispe Huanca has been a vocal supporter of the
Minister, which only adds to Choquehuanca's trivial role.
Indeed, Choquehuanca appears to have been only marginally
involved in Bolivia's key foreign policy issues to date.
GREENLEE