Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LAPAZ3400, WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LAPAZ3400.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LAPAZ3400 | 2006-12-18 21:09 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy La Paz |
VZCZCXRO8185
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #3400/01 3522107
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 182107Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1676
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6399
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3723
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7593
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4843
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2095
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0611
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2168
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3228
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1985
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4290
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4732
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9317
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 003400
SIPDIS
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 003400
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2036
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP?
REF: LA PAZ 03178
Classified By: ECOPOL Counselor Andrew Erickson for reason 1.4 (d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Evo Morales' election in December 2005 was a political
earthquake in Bolivia, sweeping aside political expectations
that have defined Bolivian politics for generations and at
the same time breaking open fissures and offering up new
possibilities. While President Morales' popularity has risen
and fallen since his election, his popularity has surged
since the hydrocarbons nationalization and his successful use
of political hardball tactics to overcome an
opposition-imposed blockade of the senate. For now, the
traditional opposition appears to be crumbling under the
GOB's pressure. While it is too early to discern the final
shifts of Bolivia's political tectonic plates this cable is
an effort to explore the new political geography of current
and potentially future leaders of the country. End Summary.
-----------------------------
INDIGENOUS & REGIONAL LEADERS
-----------------------------
¶2. (C) RENE JOAQUINO CABRERA: A mason by trade, Potosi Mayor
Rene Joaquino Cabrera is an emerging politician known for
competent management, reported honesty, and efforts to govern
transparently. Despite a low public profile, Joaquino has
been involved in politics since 1993 and has twice been
elected mayor of Potosi. His political group, the Social
Alliance of the People, has earned a reputation of acting
independently and moderately to build consensus within
Bolivia's Constituent Assembly (CA). However, Joaquino does
not have the name recognition or funding necessary for a
national campaign. Given the number of potential candidates
for the next presidential race, there may not be enough
political space for Joaquino to make a convincing bid for
national office. Despite these challenges to Joaquino's
emergence nationally, his indigenous background and personal
biography as a former child laborer in the country's mines
could galvanize popular support.
¶3. (C) OSCAR GERARDO MONTES: A member of the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) party, Tarija Mayor Oscar Montes is
an intelligent strategist who understands the realities that
the political opposition faces in Bolivia's current political
climate. With a wealth of political experience that includes
positions within national and local government, Montes has
regional name recognition within Tarija and enjoys a good
reputation. Understanding the political chasm that separates
the country's eastern and western regions, Montes has
expressed interest in creating a politically viable
alternative to the MAS that includes an alliance among
Bolivia's southern-most departments (Chuquisaca, Potosi,
Ouro, and Tarija). He is politically aligned with Joaquino
(see above). Poloffs believe a national ticket featuring
Joaquino as the presidential candidate and Montes as the
candidate for vice-president could empower Bolivia's southern
departments and garner wide national support.
¶4. (C) PEDRO TICANA: Former minister of indigenous affairs
under the Mesa and Rodriguez governments, Pedro Ticana is
unaffiliated with a particular political party and is an
effective political operator with a diverse political
background. A former adviser to Movement Towards Socialism
(MAS), Ticana is now closely aligned with Potosi Mayor
Joaquino and eastern Bolivia. Helping Joaquino organize a
new political party, Ticana could help establish a political
block comprising the country's southern and eastern
departments. Ticana's political experience with three
LA PAZ 00003400 002 OF 005
different governments demonstrates his ability to work beyond
party lines to establish effective political connections and
build consensus. As a Quechua, Ticana has the ability to
take advantage of the political prominence indigenous groups
now enjoy. Political analysts, however, note Ticana prefers
to remain behind the scenes rather than seek a national
leadership position. At a November 2006 indigenous
roundtable with Ambassadors Goldberg and Shapiro, Ticana
presented himself as a moderate political thinker who seeks
to establish a political environment that values inclusion
and dialogue.
¶5. (C) MARIO COSSIO CEJAS: Touting a wide range of
experience in academia and politics, Tarija Prefect Mario
Cossio's potential as a rising opposition leader is aided by
his hydrocarbons-rich prefecture. Given Tarija's
hydrocarbons revenues, Cossio is well-equipped to advance the
agenda of the media luna (Pando, Beni, Tarija, and Santa Cruz
departments), especially on regional autonomy. A member of
Camino al Cambio, a civic political group, Cossio enjoys
broad public support and is viewed positively by the Bolivian
national media. His ability to rise as a national opposition
leader may also be aided by his discreet role in the highly
publicized divide between the media luna and the GOB, which
could help Cossio attract more wide-ranging political
support. Physically mestizo, Cossio can tap into the support
President Morales now enjoys by Bolivians who identify with
him and his background.
¶6. (C) RUBEN COSTAS: The public face of the media luna and a
member of Autonomia Por Bolivia, Ruben Costas' position as
prefect of the economic powerhouse Santa Cruz department
gives him a natural edge in establishing himself as a
regional opposition leader. Costas' willingness to work with
the United States would make him a solid democratic partner.
His politically savvy use of the media to advance the
interests of the media luna have helped establish Costas as
one of the primary political opposition leaders. His public
confrontations with the Morales administration, the latest
bringing a public retraction by Morales of his accusations
that Costas was involved in a plot against him, have helped
Costas score public victories against the GOB. Given his
close relationship with other prefects in eastern Bolivia and
his leadership on regional autonomy, Costas is well-known and
respected in the east. However, his close association with
eastern Bolivia may limit him to a regional leadership
position, as the Altiplano has historically opposed
candidates hailing from the east, especially the Santa Cruz
department.
-------------
THE DINOSAURS
-------------
¶7. (C) JOSE LUIS PAREDES MUNOZ: A member of PODEMOS who
values U.S. assistance in Bolivia, La Paz prefect Jose Luis
Paredes stands out as a potential national opposition leader.
In an October 11 meeting with ECOPOL, Paredes privately
expressed his interest in obtaining U.S. support to run for
the presidency (poloff explained that we do not intervene in
Bolivia's internal affairs). As the former mayor of El Alto,
Paredes has a strong base of support in the Altiplano,
despite the efforts of several MAS-controlled social sector
groups to drive him from office. With a history of
demonstrating an ability to govern, Paredes has responded
well to the enormous pressure he is under from his
constituency and from the central government. With an eye
towards his political future, Paredes is attempting to shore
up support through a public relations campaign highlighting
his accomplishments as prefect. However, Paredes remains
very vulnerable to allegations of corruption in regard to
charges filed against him on October 16 for actions allegedly
committed while he was mayor of El Alto.
LA PAZ 00003400 003 OF 005
¶8. (C) MANFRED REYES VILLA: A former presidential candidate,
Cochabamba Prefect and Agrupacion Unidad por Cochabamba (AUC)
leader Manfred Reyes Villa has a wealth of political
experience and broad name recognition although whispers of
corruption haunt him. Known for delivering on his promises,
Reyes is popular among his constituents, which is
particularly challenging given his position in an otherwise
MAS-dominated prefecture. Despite his political experience,
Reyes' political potential may have peaked during his 2002
presidential campaign, when he garnered approximately 22
percent of the national vote. Lacking a politically relevant
party, Reyes ties to Bolivia's old guard politicians will
likely keep him from regaining a national position. Although
Reyes may be unable to assume a national role, he will likely
remain an important player regionally.
¶9. (C) SAMUEL DORIA MEDINA: A wealthy prominent businessman
and national political figure (since his third place finish
in Bolivia's December 2005 national elections) Samuel Doria
Medina is the head of the National Unity (UN) party and a
delegate in the CA. An entrepreneur and former minister
under ex-President Jaime Paz Zamora, Medina's financial
resources and position within the CA enable him to coordinate
a national opposition movement. Known for having political
ambitions, Medina may try to thrust himself into the next
presidential race without regard for his realistic chances of
winning it. Medina's chances to run for the presidency,
however, have been reportedly neutralized by his willingness
to broker deals with the MAS in the CA and threats by the GOB
to nationalize his businesses. While the impact of these
reports are unknown, Medina would still have to find support
outside his party and overcome the leftist, indigenous trend
in Bolivian politics if he were to attempt a presidential
campaign. In the meantime, Medina will likely continue to
play a key role building consensus in the CA.
----------
IRRELEVANT
----------
¶10. (C) JORGE "TUTO" QUIROGA RAMIREZ: The recognized leader
of PODEMOS, Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga is considered the glue that
binds his party in the CA and in Bolivia's congress.
Unfortunately, he seems tone-deaf to Bolivia's radically
changed political environment, and has been unable to strike
a chord with the population. As the leader of the largest
opposition group in the CA and a former president, Quiroga
remains Bolivia's primary opposition leader. Like Ortiz,
Quiroga's leadership of PODEMOS may undermine his ability to
win national office. Beginning late-November 2006, Quiroga
has started to take a more public stance on divisive issues
between his party and the GOB to build pressure and support
for a two-thirds vote in the CA. While effective as a party
leader, most political analysts concede Quiroga would not
fare well in a future presidential race. In a recent meeting
with the Ambassador, Quiroga appeared less interested in
Bolivian politics than discussing foreign policy -- that of
Bolivia as well as the U.S.
¶11. (C) OSCAR ORTIZ: An influential and well-known
opposition senator from Santa Cruz, Oscar Ortiz has made a
name for himself by using his political position to publicly
criticize the GOB. A member of PODEMOS, with a background in
business, Ortiz understands the intricacies of economics and
can use his experience to communicate policies that would
resonate with a Bolivian electorate that is increasingly
focused on employment. Like Costas, his ties to eastern
Bolivia and his pro-business outlook may diminish his ability
to rise through the political ranks, particularly in light of
GOB rhetoric against free market economics. Ortiz's
affiliation with the PODEMOS party may also prevent his
LA PAZ 00003400 004 OF 005
emergence as an opposition leader that can gain broad
political appeal.
-------------
LEFT FIELDERS
-------------
¶12. (S/NF) SANTOS RAMIREZ: The president of Bolivia's senate,
Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) senator Santos Ramirez is
considered the political confidant of President Morales. A
lawyer by education and a teacher by training, Ramirez has an
extensive history in politics as a member of congress before
being elected to the senate in 2006. Born in the Potosi
department, Ramirez is well-known in Potosi and serves as the
head of the MAS party there. With a political career closely
aligned to President Morales' legislative agenda, Ramirez'
political future is considered heavily dependent on the
political successes of the GOB. Rumored to be a major player
in the MAS' political playbook, Ramirez is in a position to
assume a leadership position in the event President Morales
stumbles (reftel A). Ramirez' role in railroading
controversial legislative measures supported by President
Morales confirms the opinions of many political analysts who
consider him a radical. Emboldened by the newfound wave of
popularity President Morales is enjoying, Ramirez may shed
his politically adept style for a more radical approach.
With his strong alliances with the GOB, Ramirez may ride out
the wave of President Morales' strong popularity before
revealing his personal aspirations to emerge on Bolivia's
national stage. Sensitive reporting indicates that Ramirez
may be very vulnerable on corruption and human smuggling
charges.
¶13. (C) FERNANDO HUANACUNI: A relative unknown in Bolivia's
political sphere, professor, lawyer, and Aymara writer
Fernando Huanacuni has raised the eyebrows of political
analysts convinced President Morales' successor will hail
from the country's indigenous community. Relatively young in
political terms at thirty-nine years old, Huanacuni may
present a fresh perspective that would be welcomed by a
growing population of young Bolivians frustrated with a
government they view as unresponsive. A resident of El Alto
and born in the La Paz department, Huanacuni's ability to
galvanize support for a national run would directly challenge
President Morales' base of support. Despite his lack of name
recognition, Huanacuni's television show on social pressures
is helping him gain wider recognition if he uses it as a
method to raise his political profile. Similar to the
assessments made for other indigenous politicians,
Huanacuni's indigenous background could help him galvanize
greater support.
¶14. (C) JUAN DEL GRANADO: Known as the "the Gardener" for his
passionate support for environmentally-friendly public works,
La Paz Mayor Juan del Granado is popular among his
constituency for his efforts to reform La Paz and fight
corruption. He stands as a likely candidate to emerge
nationally from the MAS' rank-and-file if the opportunity
presented itself. A former member of the MIR and the
Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), Granado is the founder and
current leader of the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM), a political
party he started when he ran for mayor that is now allied
with the MAS. In addition to the publicity Granado enjoys
from his position, his skillful use of radio and television
for constituent outreach help him raise his profile among the
electorate while highlighting his accomplishments in office.
Despite his alliances with MAS, however, Granado political
viability remains murky at best. Considered a member of the
middle class, Granado would likely have to counter negative
perceptions of the middle class among the indigenous
community and traditionally marginalized groups to court
their vote. A former minister in the Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada administration, Granado would be an easy target for
LA PAZ 00003400 005 OF 005
this past association and this would present a high hurdle
for Granado to clear in a national run for office.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (C) The December 2005 and July 2006 national elections
exposed what turned out to be a hollow center of leadership
in Bolivia's political traditional political classes. It was
in this vacuum that Evo Morales took the presidency;
Bolivia's traditional leaders are still reacting to the
earthquake his victory represented. The rough-and-tumble
politics favored by Morales have further exposed the many
weaknesses of the traditional opposition. Most recently, the
emergence of divisive issues within the CA has spurred some
political leaders to action, and offered tentative clues to
possible alternative opposition leadership. While a
resurgence of the old opposition is possible, it is unlikely
that Bolivia's future leader will be one of the political
dinosaurs and irrelevant leaders of the past. Bolivia
remains an overwhelmingly poor country. Given the leftward
shift of rhetoric among many voters, a post-Morales
environment would likely offer serious electoral advantages
to a leader emerging from Evo's indigenous supporters. If
Morales were to exit unexpectedly, an indigenous or strong
regional leader would be the most likely candidate to fill
his position. This year, President Morales has had a lucky
run, with high hydrocarbons and other commodity revenues
leaving him abundant room to maneuver. That situation will
change dramatically, however, when his economic luck runs
out. End Comment.
GOLDBERG
SELECT * FROM `cable` WHERE `id` = '90016' ORDER BY `date` ASC