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Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD31, PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF BRIEFS GEN SCHOOMAKER AND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07ISLAMABAD31 | 2007-01-03 13:01 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO7979
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0031/01 0031351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031351Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5813
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9748
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1624
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3926
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0899
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1066
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1830
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6608
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4844
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9966
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1042
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2343
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0979
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3938
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0947
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 9210
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1639
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Wednesday, 03 January 2007, 13:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000031
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/02/2016
TAGS AF, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF BRIEFS GEN SCHOOMAKER AND
AMBASSADOR ON STRATEGY FOR BORDER SECURITY
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
¶1. (C) Introduction and summary: During a December 29 meeting, President (and Chief of Army Staff) Musharraf reinforced for U.S. Chief of Army Staff GEN Schoomaker and the Ambassador that Pakistan and the U.S, are in the war on terrorism together, sharing the same goals and fighting the same enemy. Noting that allies may sometimes see things differently or disagree on how to proceed, Musharraf outlined his strategy to secure Pakistani territory from violent extremism and the prevent it from being used to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. In Musharraf’s view, the essence of the problem of (and solution to) the Taliban insurgency lies in Afghanistan; that said, the President also acknowledged Pakistan’s responsibility to prevent cross-border collusion and support from militants in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). To date, Pakistan’s primary focus has been on disrupting Islamist extremists in the FATA, Musharraf said, but the government now sees that it must make greater efforts in Balochistan. Musharraf summarized his goal: Pakistan checks support for the insurgency on this side of the border, so that the ISAF-led Coalition can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. While underscoring his own commitment, Musharraf questioned the degree to which Afghanistan is willing to respond to Pakistan’s needs, noting that Pakistan’s request for assistance in capturing Baloch militant Brahamdagh Bugti have yet to produce any results. End introduction and summary.
¶2. (C) Comment: Musharraf was frank and forthcoming about Pakistan’s on-going reassessment of its border security tactics, while underscoring his commitment to a comprehensive strategy: winning the loyalty of the local population along the border through political dialogue and socio-economic investment while using special operations forces to root out and hunt down al Qaeda, Taliban and other anti-Coalition elements based in Pakistan. Admitting that he is dissatisfied with the facts on the ground after the September 5 jirga accord in North Waziristan, Musharraf stressed that the task ahead is not to start over from scratch, but to make the accord work and then extend it to the rest of the border -- an assessment with which Embassy Islamabad agrees. Even as he reaffirmed his determination to secure the border region, however, Musharraf betrayed deep personal frustration that Karzai’s government appears to be doing little to apprehend and repatriate Brahamdagh Bugti, End comment.
How to Proceed?
---------------
¶3. (C) Musharraf described the three critical points underlying his strategy for enhancing border security:
-- Ending cross-border support for the Taliban in Afghanistan -- Closing Afghan refugee camps in Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) -- Targeting al Qaeda and Taliban senior leaders who have established themselves on the Pakistani side of the border.
In order to stop militants from unlawfully crossing into Afghanistan, Pakistan will selectively mine and fence the border. The President has tasked the Army’s Director General of Military Operations to be prepare to brief an implementation plan that would be deployed on a test basis. Other Pakistani officials have been directed to devise a strategy to close the Pir Alazai refugee camp in Balochistan
ISLAMABAD 00000031 002 OF 003
and to significantly improve monitoring of access to and activities with the three other most troubling camps.
¶4. (C) Finally, Musharraf said that he had directed Pakistan’s security forces that the government must proactively clean the al Qaeda and Taliban presence out of the border region, while simultaneously expanding the political dialogue with the local population. We are now engaged on strengthening enforcement of the North Waziristan Agency jirga accord, the President said, and seeking a similar accommodation with tribal leaders in South Waziristan. Musharraf acknowledged that some of the government’s interlocutors in North Waziristan might be considered problematic from an outsider’s perspective (a tacit recognition of international criticism of the government’s willingness to include local militant commanders and “taliban” in the jirga negotiations), but these are the people that must be enlisted if Pakistani authorities are to break the ties to the insurgency in Afghanistan. Musharraf stressed that the Special Operations Task Force must act more forcefully in targeting al Qaeda and Taliban commanders in the tribal agencies (a use of force addressed in the North Waziristan accord); senior Army staff will brief him on January 5 on plans to step up this engagement.
Need for Coordination Across the Durrand Line
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Having outlined Pakistan’s efforts to enhance security in the border regions, President Musharraf told GEN Schoomaker that he is deeply frustrated that the Government of Afghanistan has not been responsive to greater bilateral cooperation. In fact, Musharraf argued, Afghanistan is supporting terrorist, specifically the violent Baloch nationalist insurgency led by Brahamdagh Bugti, who Musharraf claims shifts between Kabul and Kandahar. Pakistan cannot tolerate the increase in terrorist attacks seen in Balochistan over recent months. Despite pressing President Karzai directly for assistance in repatriating Bugti to face charges in Pakistan and sharing Pakistan’s frustration over Bugti’s apparent safe haven in Afghanistan with a parade of international officials (ISAF GEN Richards, A/S Boucher, etc.), Musharraf said, nothing is being done to address the problem. Pakistan supports its allies in the fight against terrorism and expects the same support when it comes to apprehending terrorists who target Pakistan. Warming to his topic, Musharraf shared his anger over President Karzai’s anti-Pakistan public remarks in December, observing that he had been on the verge of calling a press conference to retaliate in kind until his staff intervened in the interest of dampening the unhelpful cross-border rhetoric.
¶6. (C) Despite Musharraf’s personal frustration with his Afghan counterpart, he commended reports that Karzai wishes to arm local militias in Afghanistan southern and southeastern provinces as an idea worthy of consideration. The concept of arming local tribal leaders to stand with the government against the Taliban might work, Musharraf said, if Karzai is working with the right people. (Note: We are not sure whether the President was referring to current efforts to enhance Afghanistan’s auxiliary police service or to Karzai’s spring 2006 push for provincial governors to raise their own militias. It is equally difficult to judge whether Musharraf was sincere in his endorsement or simply trying to say something positive after the heated criticism of Kabul’s failure to respond to Pakistan’s requests to apprehend Bugti. End note.) Musharraf said that he had accepted an offer by
ISLAMABAD 00000031 003 OF 003
EU representative Vendrell to serve as an informal communication bridge to President Karzai. Musharraf’s first message to Karzai via the Vendrell channel is that the cross-border aspersions and accusations must stop so that both sides can focus their energies and resources on defeating their common enemy -- the Taliban.
¶7. (U) Post has shared the information in this cable directly with Emb Kabul. CROCKER