VZCZCXRO2735
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSM #1055 2410616
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290616Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0139
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2588
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0010

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 001055 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS GG SR SW
SUBJECT: BILDT ON GEORGIA MISSILE INCIDENT FOLLOW-UP, KOSOVO, CHAD 

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 988 B. STATE 109526 

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (c) On August 28, the Ambassador raised the Georgia missile incident and Kosovo with Foreign Minister Bildt in a meeting devoted to other issues. On Georgia, Bildt speculated on the context of the incident and said we need to keep diplomatic pressure on, but that Zuzul was not the right choice for OSCE's representative. On Kosovo, Bildt said we need to keep quiet and let the process go forward. End summary. 

Georgia Missile Incident 
------------------------ 

¶2. (s) Ambassador Wood discussed the Georgia missile incident and its diplomatic follow-up (ref A) with Foreign Minister Bildt August 28 in meeting at the Embassy. Bildt said that it was clear that the reports of the experts on the missile incident were accurate, and diplomatic follow-on had so far been useful in putting pressure on Russia to which it was paying attention. He added, however, that there seemed to be context connected to the incident that had not been disclosed by either Georgia or Russia. Bildt said the Georgian radar against which the Russian's aborted attack may have been directed "should not have been there." He said that there was also "something else" going on in the incident in the Kodori valley, though it was not clear what. Bildt said Georgia had been importing lots of weapons from Ukraine. He offered a hypothetical scenario where the Georgians could have shot missiles "they were not supposed to have" at the Russian aircraft; neither side would want to acknowledge what really happened. Bildt thought the Russian incursion had been ordered by Moscow and not by the Russian military command in the North Caucusus, but it was not clear who in Moscow was behind it. 

¶3. (c) Bildt said the diplomatic follow-on needed to be carefully managed. Bildt said he had dined with Georgian President Sakashvili August 26 (apparently in Slovenia) and told him that Georgia should let its friends handle this one. The Georgians, Bildt said, appeared disposed to do so. Bildt said he thought Croatian diplomat Miomir Zuzul, who had been appointed Personal Representative of OSCE Chairman-in-Office Moratinos for this matter was not the right person. Bildt said that Zuzul, who was Croatia's Ambassador to the UN at the time (and later Ambassador to the U.S.), was implicated in the decision to go forward with the Croatian government's 1995 ethnic-cleansing Operation Storm. This would discredit him. He said Zuzul should not be the OSCE's representative for Georgia. 

Kosovo 
------ 

¶4. (c) On Kosovo (ref B), Bildt said what was necessary now was a period of quiet, including, he added, from the U.S. We needed to see what technical fixes could be found. He was not sure where Russia was. It would take weeks to evaluate what is possible. The process had been engaged; it needed to be allowed to work its way through undisturbed. 

Chad 
---- 

¶5. (c) Bildt said he will be traveling September 3 to Chad in connection with a possible Swedish and EU role in a UN mission there. WOOD