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Viewing cable 08THEHAGUE225, NETHERLANDS/IRAN: NO OBJECTIONS TO DUTCH FIRM INCO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08THEHAGUE225 2008-03-06 13:01 2011-01-19 20:08 SECRET Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ1878
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0225 0661304
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061304Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1194
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018 
TAGS: PARM MRCRE PREL ETTC IR NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: NO OBJECTIONS TO DUTCH FIRM INCO 
TECH EXPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE ...



144565
2008-03-06
08THEHAGUE225
Embassy The Hague
SECRET
08STATE15228
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000225
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, EUR/PRA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PARM MRCRE PREL ETTC IR NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: NO OBJECTIONS TO DUTCH FIRM INCO
TECH EXPORT
REF: A. STATE 15228
B. THE HAGUE 174
Classified By: CDA Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) Per reftels, MFA Senior Advisor for Nonproliferation
and Nuclear Affairs Ceta Noland told polmiloff March 6 that
the Dutch firm Inter Connection Technologies (InCo Tech) had
contacted the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs on December
17, 2007, regarding the planned export of connectors to Iran.
Noland said the GONL determined at that time that the
connectors in question did not pose a WMD risk; she suggested
the connectors were quite ordinary and run-of-the-mill. As
such, she said no objections were raised against this planned
export.
2. (S) Noland doubted but could not confirm if the shipment
of connectors had already been exported to Iran. She said it
typically takes several months after an export approval for
the export to occur. Dutch customs officials can check
whether an export has taken place, but Noland explained that
due to an e-system output delay, there is typically a
three-month delay between the date of the export and the
export's appearance in the Dutch customs' database. Thus,
she noted that even if the export had occurred immediately
following the export approval, it would not yet be listed in
the database. Noland welcomed any additional information
from Washington regarding the specifications of the
connectors, and how they might pose a WMD risk -- if the
shipment has not gone forward, then the GONL might be able to
reexamine the case.
Schofer