

Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AE
AR
AG
AJ
AFIN
AU
AM
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ACOA
AEC
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
AS
AL
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AGMT
CJAN
CH
CU
CASC
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CLINTON
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CA
CBW
CM
CE
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CD
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CDG
CJUS
CARSON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
CV
EU
EFIN
EG
ETTC
EINV
ENRG
EI
ECPS
EINT
ECON
EIND
ETRD
EPET
EUN
EZ
EMIN
ELAB
EAID
EAGR
ET
EC
EAIR
ENVR
ES
ECA
EWWT
ER
ELTN
EFIS
EN
EXTERNAL
ECIN
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INRB
IRAJ
IN
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
IAEA
ITPHUM
IV
IPR
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
ITALY
ITALIAN
INTERPOL
KE
KTFN
KDEM
KJUS
KNNP
KGHG
KZ
KIPR
KWBG
KIRF
KPAO
KDRG
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPAL
KISL
KG
KACT
KN
KS
KGIC
KRAD
KU
KCOM
KBIO
KMCA
KCOR
KV
KHDP
KTIP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KSPR
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KOLY
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KMDR
KPKO
KTDB
KMRS
KFRD
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KUNR
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KOMC
KAWK
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KMPI
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
KNUC
KPLS
KIRC
MARR
MOPS
MU
MASS
MY
MNUC
MCAP
MA
MO
MTCRE
MG
MASC
MX
MCC
MZ
ML
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MTCR
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MR
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MPOS
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
PGOV
PREL
PINR
PO
PINS
PTER
PK
PHUM
PARM
PL
PE
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PGOF
PROP
PARMS
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PNAT
PROV
PEL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SU
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SCUL
SW
SOCI
SF
SO
SR
SG
SMIG
SL
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
STEINBERG
UK
UNSC
UG
US
UZ
UP
UNO
UNMIK
UY
UN
UNGA
UE
UNESCO
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
USUN
USEU
UV
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BEIJING1634, CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING1634.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING1634 | 2009-06-17 06:06 | 2010-11-30 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO0731
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1634/01 1680645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170645Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001634
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2034
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV CH KN KS
SUBJECT: CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b/d
).
Summary
¶1. (C) In a June 16 luncheon in honor of visiting Hong Kong
CG Joe Donovan hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that
China liked a U.S. proposal described by Ambassador Bosworth
here on June 5 to put all issues related to the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into a package for
negotiation. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the United States holds the
key to bringing the DPRK back to the negotiation table and
suggested that succession concerns in North Korea might be
causing Kim Jong-il to escalate tensions with the United
States so that his successor, perhaps Kim Jong-un, could then
step in to ease pressure. XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that China experts
believe the DPRK has been processing highly enriched uranium
but asserted that the program was only in an initial phase.
XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that ROK envoy to the Six-Party Talks had not
offered any new ideas during his June 9 visit to Beijing and
that Japan's focus on the abductee issue continued to cause
concerns at the MFA. End Summary.
Chinese Protests to DPRK Have Had No Effect
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) In a June 16 luncheon hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX made
clear that the PRC viewed recent provocative actions by the
DPRK as having gone too far. He assured the Charge that
Chinese officials had expressed Chinese displeasure to North
Korean counterparts and had pressed the DPRK to return to the
negotiation table. Unfortunately, XXXXXXXXXXXX added, those protests
had had "no effect." "The only country that can make
progress with the North Koreans is the United States," he
maintained. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, although China had assured North
Korean leaders that the United States was ready to have
bilateral talks with them, the North Koreans had insisted
that any message from the United States to the DPRK should be
delivered directly, not through China. XXXXXXXXXXXX took this as
further evidence that only by having direct talks with the
United States would North Korea return to the Six-Party
Talks.
China Likes a Package Approach
------------------------------
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that China viewed favorably the
USG proposal of putting all facets of a possible Korean
Peninsula denuclearization agreement into one package. XXXXXXXXXXXX
characterized Chinese and U.S. core interests in a nuclear
free Korean Peninsula as "shared." He reminded his hosts
that Punggye, the site of the DPRK nuclear test, was near the
Chinese border and that any accident there could have had
dire consequences for Northeast China. XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that
China was as concerned as the United States about
proliferation from North Korea. The only difference in the
China and U.S. positions, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained, was "the United
States was the key while China was only in a position to
apply a little oil to the lock."
Building Trust
--------------
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that building trust between the DPRK and
the United States would be difficult. In North Korea's view,
XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, the destruction of its nuclear capability was
an irreversible step while decisions by the United States
could be easily reversed. When CGs Donovan and Goldberg both
pointed out that trust was a two-way street and that North
Korea had not evinced a great deal of it, XXXXXXXXXXXX was evasive.
When pressed whether he believed the DPRK had been
reprocessing highly enriched uranium (HEU), XXXXXXXXXXXX said yes,
adding that Chinese experts believed the enrichment was only
in its initial phases and that any DPRK HEU program would not
be "very useful."
Domestic Concerns in North Korea Influence Talks
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that domestic politics in North Korea
were in a large way responsible for Pyongyang's recent
actions. He was dismissive of DPRK justifications for the
nuclear test as a response to the UN Security Council
BEIJING 00001634 002 OF 002
Presidential Statement critical of North Korea's April 5
Taepo-Dong 2 launch. "Kim Jong-il was obviously planning the
nuclear test at the same time as the missile launch so his
justification for the test makes no sense," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. XXXXXXXXXXXX
opined that the rapid pace of provocative actions in North
Korea was due to Kim Jong-il's declining health and might be
part of a gambit under which Kim Jong-il would escalate
tensions with the United States so that his successor,
presumably Kim Jong-un, could then step in and ease those
tensions.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that he
kept abreast of Western media reports about North Korea.
XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that U.S. experts should not assume North
Korea would implode after Kim Jong-il's death. He said that
PRC analysts concluded that the regime would still function
normally and discounted strongly any suggestion that the
system would collapse once Kim Jong-il disappeared.
ROK has no new ideas - Japan can only scuttle talks
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ROK Six-Party Talks envoy Wi Sung-lac
had met with VFM Wu Dawei on June 9 but had offered nothing
new. "The South Koreans have plenty of ideas, but we've
heard them all before," he complained, adding that the ROK
government was too close to the situation in North Korea to
be objective. Turning to Japan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Japan's
obsession with the abductee issue reminded him of a Chinese
expression for an individual who was too weak to make
something work, yet strong enough to destroy it.
Participants
-------------
Charge Dan Piccuta
Joe Donovan, U.S. Consul General Hong Kong
Robert Goldberg, Consul General Guangzhou
Mark Lambert, Regional Unit Chief
Jim Brown, interpreter
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
PICCUTA