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Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI736, CROWN PRINCE SOUNDS ALARM ON IRAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABUDHABI736 2009-07-20 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #0736/01 2011251
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201251Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2741
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000736 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON IR AE
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE SOUNDS ALARM ON IRAN 
 
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1. (U) This cable contains an action request in para 12. 
 
2. (S/NF) Summary. On July 15, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner 
joined Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan 
(MBZ) and Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan (ABZ) 
for a dinner covering a range of regional issues.  MBZ expressed 
serious concern over Iran's regional intentions and pleaded for the 
U.S. to shorten its decision-making timeline and develop a "plan B." 
He encouraged the U.S. to clearly communicate 'red lines' to the 
Iranian Government, on nuclear and regional stability issues, with 
direct consequences for transgressions.  He painted to a nuclear Iran 
as an existential threat to the UAE and invoked the well being of his 
grandchildren while urging the U.S. to act quickly.  MBZ asked for 
close coordination between the U.S. and UAE to deal with the Iranian 
threat. End Summary. 
 
3. (S/NF) Secretary Geithner asked the Crown Prince for his views on 
the situation in the region, particularly in Iran.  Geithner 
described the U.S. strategy on Iran, including our intention to move 
forward with multilateral financial sanctions while waiting for Iran 
to decide on its engagement with the U.S.   He also conveyed 
appreciation for the important support that UAE provides to other 
regional trouble spots. 
 
4. (S/NF) MBZ described a nuclear armed Iran as absolutely untenable. 
 He pointed to Iran's relentless ambitions to restore regional 
hegemony as evidenced by destabilizing interference in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Afghanistan and Palestine.  He believes that 'all hell will break 
loose' if Iran attains the bomb, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Turkey developing their own nuclear weapons capability and Iran 
instigating Sunni - Shia conflict throughout the world.  He said Iran 
is surrounding Israel - driven by ideological conviction - and will 
threaten Israel's existence should it go nuclear.  At the same time, 
he described Iran's ambitions as reflecting a desire to restore 
Persia's great-power status, rather than driven by religious 
convictions. 
 
5. (S/NF) MBZ differentiated the long term threat posed by Iran from 
other menacing states like North Korea or Syria.  Where these other 
regimes were ruled by small cadres of corrupt 'old guard' officials, 
the Iranian regime has raised its next generation to carry out its 
designs for hegemony.  As such, the world will be dealing with Iran's 
destabilizing ambitions for decades.  MBZ assesses that the Iranian 
regime has emerged from the recent election strife stronger and more 
resolute. 
 
6. (S/NF) While careful not to suQY.JQoWoRth Iran, 
MBZ described a near term conventional war with Iran as clearly 
preferable to the long term consequences of a nuclear armed Iran. 
Without timely and decisive action by the United States, MBZ believes 
that Israel will strike Iran, causing Iran to launch missile attacks 
- including hits on the UAE -  and to unleash terror attacks 
worldwide. In his view, 'the map of the Middle East' would change. 
He expects widespread civilian conflict to erupt as Iran sparks Sunni 
- Shia violence worldwide (including the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia which he sees as the greatest vulnerability, along with Iraq, 
in the Arab world).  He speculated that such an event could unfold 
within six months time and resolved that the UAE is prepared to 
defend itself.  He believes that an Israeli strike will not be 
successful in stopping Iran's nuclear program, and therefore we need 
to plan. 
 
7. (S/NF) Regarding the recent election in Iran, MBZ cautioned that 
Mir Hossein Musavi is no different than Ahmedinejad when it comes to 
their nuclear ambitions, 'same goal, different tactic.'  In this 
respect, he regards Musavi as more dangerous than his competitor, as 
at least Ahmedinejad was 'an open book.'  He reminded Secretary 
Geithner that Musavi and his advisors are part of the same group that 
took the U.S. Embassy in 1979. 
 
8. (S/NF) MBZ questioned Europe's basic understanding of the threat 
posed by Iran, and wrote off their resolve to deal with the 
situation.  He was appalled by 'top European diplomats' that were 
unconcerned by the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. He 
shared his theory that Russia was trying to instigate conflict 
between the U.S. and Iran as a means to weaken the U.S. and drive up 
oil prices.  He suggested we could use Russia's narrow views to help 
persuade Russia to join international actions against Iran. 
 
9. (S/NF) MBZ stated that financial sanctions would never be 
sufficient to stop Iran, but allowed that the U.S. should continue 
with such measures to demonstrate to the Arab world that we tried 
everything.  He pledged continued cooperation and support for 
international sanctions and encouraged further action in the UN and 
EU, as well as the U.S. 
10. (S/NF) MBZ suggested that the key to containing Iran revolves 
around progress in the Israel/Palestine issue.  He argued that it 
will be essential to bring Arab public opinion on board in any 
conflict with Iran and roughly 80% of the public is amenable to 
persuasion.  To win them over, the U.S. should quickly bring about a 
two state solution over the objections of the Netanyahu government. 
He suggested working with moderate Palestinians that support the road 
map, and forget about the others as there is no time to waste. 
 
11. (S/NF) Foreign Minister ABZ urged the U.S. to make better use of 
its allies in the region and engage Russia and China in a productive 
way on this issue wherever possible.  He urged clear and forceful 
messaging to Iran and more regional gatherings (i.e. P+5+1 and GCC+3) 
to increase pressure and isolation. 
 
12. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: MBZ would like to visit Washington in late 
July to discuss Iran with President Obama and other senior officials. 
Treasury and Embassy recommend continuing the dialogue with MBZ as 
soon as possible. 
 
13. (SBU) This cable has been cleared by Andy Baukol, Department of 
Treasury Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs. 
GREENE