VZCZCXRO0333
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1468/01 2111444
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301444Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3306
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001468 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2029 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: NDP INSIDER: MILITARY WILL ENSURE TRANSFER OF POWER 
 
REF: 08 CAIRO 2091 
 
Classified By: Economic-Political Minister-Counselor Donald A. Blome 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  KEY POINTS 
 
-- (S) NDP insider and former minister Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal 
Dessouki dismissed public and media speculation about 
succession.  He said Egyptian military and security services 
would ensure a smooth transfer of power, even to a civilian. 
 
-- (S) Dessouki called opposition parties weak and democracy 
a "long term goal."  He said that the MB had no legitimate 
political role, adding that mixing religion and politics in 
Egypt was not wise and would not be permitted. 
 
¶2. (S) Comment:  Dessouki is an NDP insider who has held a 
number of key positions.  His assurances that the Egyptian 
military and security services would ensure a smooth 
succession to a civilian (by implication Gamal Mubarak) were 
unusually straightforward and blunt.  The idea that the 
military remains a key political and economic force is 
conventional wisdom here.  However, other observers tell us 
that the military has grown less influential, more fractured 
and its leadership weaker in recent years (reftel).  They 
suggest that in a succession scenario in which President 
Mubarak is no longer present, outcomes are less predictable. 
End comment. 
 
¶3. (S) On July 22, PolOff met with National Democratic Party 
(NDP) Media Secretary, and member of the influential NDP 
Policies Committee Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal Dessouki.  Without 
prompting, he offered newly-arrived PolOff advice on how to 
approach political issues in Egypt.  He counseled PolOff not 
to "run around" town asking questions about Egypt's next 
leader, suggesting that most offered only opinions not facts. 
 He said that this kind of wide-ranging engagement "by our 
friends" demonstrated a certain "naivete."  Dessouki 
suggested that PolOff also steer clear of the many 
uncorroborated reports and misguided analysis in the local 
media.  He also underscored a common NDP refrain that Egypt's 
opposition political parties were weak and self-serving. 
 
¶4. (S) Dr. Dessouki's most important message, he said was to 
always keep in mind that "the real center of power in Egypt 
is the military," a reference he said included all security 
forces.  Dessouki noted that while the military did not 
intervene directly in matters of day to day governance, it 
leaders were determined to maintain order and that the 
importance of a "legal transition" should not be 
underestimated.  Dessouki did acknowledge that the military 
is concerned about maintaining its "corporate interests," but 
was emphatic in his declaration of their commitment to a 
"constitutional" transition of power.  Dessouki went on to 
say that the military has "no objection to a civilian" as the 
next president (a remark that can be interpreted as a pointed 
reference to Gamal Mubarak).  Dessouki then reiterated that 
the NDP has not yet selected its candidate for the 2011 
presidential elections (a point Gamal Mubarak himself has 
made to us). 
 
¶5. (S) Dessouki acknowledged there would be some violence 
around the upcoming 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential 
elections, but suggested security forces would be able to 
keep it under control.  Widespread politically-motivated 
unrest, he said, was not likely because it was not part of 
the "Egyptian mentality."  Threats to daily survival, not 
politics, were the only thing to bring Egyptians to the 
streets en masse.  Dessouki said the NDP focus on economic 
reform would continue up to the elections and after any 
transition of power.  He added that Egypt was moving towards 
democracy, but that a transition from a "pharoanic" political 
system would take a long time. 
 
¶6. (S) Disdainful of its political import, Dessouki said the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was not a credible political 
organization.  As evidence of their pure self-interest, he 
cited the MB's refusal to "integrate" and become a part of 
the mainstream political process despite invitations from the 
last three Egyptian presidents.  Dessouki referred to recent 
arrests of MB members (septel) as evidence they operated 
extra-legally. (Note:  Separately, on July 26 Dessouki 
publically denied press reports that the NDP is pursuing a 
deal with the MB that would promise an end to the arrests in 
exchange for a stop to MB "internal and external" activities. 
 End note.)  Dessouki warned that because Egyptians are very 
religious people, politics and religion is a volatile mix. 
In a more strident tone, Dessouki went on to say that he, and 
President Mubarak, "would not tolerate" the existence of 
 
CAIRO 00001468  002 OF 002 
 
 
political parties with a religious agenda whether Muslim or 
Christian and suggested that there was no such thing as a 
"moderate Islamist." 
Tueller