VZCZCXRO9313
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0881/01 2101442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291442Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4161
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0100
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0291

<<218634>>
7/29/2009 14:42
09KHARTOUM881
Embassy Khartoum
CONFIDENTIAL
09KHARTOUM378
VZCZCXRO9313
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0881/01 2101442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291442Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4161
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0100
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0291
TAGS: ASEC PINS PREL PINR EFIN KE MARR SU UNSC UG
SUBJECT: GOK/GOSS AGREE ON TIMETABLE FOR SECOND TANK 
REF: KHARTOUM 00378


C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 02 khartoum 000881

Sipdis

Dept for se gration, s/usses, af a/s carson, af/e
nsc for mgavin
dept pls pass usaid for afr/sudan
addis ababa also for au

E.o. 12958: decl: 07/28/2019
Tags: asec, pins, prel, pinr, efin, ke, marr, su, unsc, ug,
cf
Subject: gok/goss agree on timetable for second tank
shipment

Ref: khartoum 00378

Classified By: CDA Robert Whitehead for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) GOSS xxxxxxxxxxxx has admitted that, on
the margins of the Washington "Forum for CPA Partners," he
pressed Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula on the need
to expedite delivery to South Sudan of tanks off-loaded from
the MV Faina. Three months had passed since Nairobi
initially agreed -- albeit in a staggered fashion and only
under cover of darkness -- to ship the SPLA its second order
of tanks (REFTEL Khartoum 00378). According to xxxxxxxxxxxx upon
xxxxxxxxxxxx instruction he told the Kenyan ForMin that if the
tanks did not start moving by Juli's end, the GOSS would be
forced to "reevaluate its relationship with Nairobi. Despite
such threats, xxxxxxxxxxxx maintained that the meeting was largely
positive. "The Kenyans are relieved that we will be routing
them through Uganda -- keeping them out of the spotlight."

¶2. (C) Asked whether he was any more confident of actual
delivery, given how earlier promises from the Kenyans had
vaporized, xxxxxxxxxxxx responded in the affirmative. xxxxxxxxxxxx and
newly-appointed xxxxxxxxxxxx had met in
Nairobi as xxxxxxxxxxxx returned from Washington to again discuss the
transfer with Kenyan Department of Defense counterparts. "We
are certain that this time they will move." xxxxxxxxxxxx further
confirmed that weapons, armaments, and the spare parts and
support packages for the T-72 tanks had already been moved
out of Nairobi into Sudan's South, although he would not
divulge their location. xxxxxxxxxxxx

¶3. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx optimism appears to be merited. xxxxxxxxxxxx
travelled to Kampala xxxxxxxxxxxx in order to meet with Ugandan counterparts on unspecified
business. xxxxxxxxxxxx remains an
integral member of the SPLA's tank procurement team, despite
the SPLA's May reshuffle which pushed him into the xxxxxxxxxxxx. SPLA Affairs Minister Nhial Deng Nhial
admitted to A/CG xxxxxxxxxxxx had been granted
extraordinary authorities to handle the totality of the
SPLA's outstanding contracts in order to ensure the circle of
those involved in the tank procurement remained small "for
obvious security reasons." xxxxxxxxxxxx The
decision to extend such authorities xxxxxxxxxxxx
would appear to indicate the entire "adminstrative chain" of
the SPLA has been shielded from the decision. END COMMENT).
At a July 23 farewell dinner, xxxxxxxxxxxx confirmed the Kenyans had
begun trans-shipment of tanks to Uganda, but could not speak
to when they would arrive in the South.

¶4. (C) Per reftel, the SPLA is dependent on Nairobi
concurrence to authorize the third and final shipment of
Juba's 2006 tanks purchase. xxxxxxxxxxxx maintained in mid-July that
Nairobi, facing increasing pressure from Khartoum, continued
to resist green-lighting the shipment. Notwithstanding
xxxxxxxxxxxx contention that the Juba/Nairobi bilateral
relationship was weathering the tank-shipment "stand-off,"
there is growing vidence to the contrary.

¶5. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx that she had access to
documents pertaining to a pending bank transfer linked to an
unspecified SPLA procurement initiative worth $34 million.
According to the contractor, past SPLA contracts consistently
included routing information for banks to Kenya. This
contract did not -- a first in this individual's tenure with
the Finance Ministry. (NOTE: The contractor further advised
that the contract would drive SPLA finances into the red;
unless the SPLA saw a budget increase next fiscal year, the
SPLA would be without financing until April 2010 if this
contract moved forward. END NOTE.) As of July 24, the
contractor did not believe this SPLA contract had gone
forward in the Finance Ministry's internal approval process.

Khartoum 00000881 002 of 002


(COMMENT: We are not sure that the contractor would be privy
to information regarding this contract's approval, however,
and think it possible that, given Finance Minister David Deng
Athorbei's failed attempts to purchase attack helicopters for
the SPLA out of Ministry of Roads and Transport monies in
November 2008, he might be sympathetic to other SPLA
procurement requests despite current GOSS budgeting woes. END
comment).

¶6. (C) Comment. Despite extensive coverage of the tank
purchases and delivery in local and internationl media, the
SPLM continues to treat the matter as a secret matter,
perhaps as a concession to Kenyan sensitivities. The
existence of the tanks, however, is one of the least secret
secrets in Khartoum.
Whitehead
...