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Viewing cable 09LONDON1644, HMG RECEPTIVE TO USG APPROACH ON URANIUM SALES TO IRAN REF: STATE 72119

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09LONDON1644 2009-07-16 12:12 2011-02-02 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy London
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLO #1644 1971246
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161246Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2883
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3483
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1298
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0892
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 0113
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2941
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 0287
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 2776
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3899
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0380
S E C R E T LONDON 001644

NOFORN SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019

TAGS: MNUC PARM IR KNNP UK

SUBJECT: HMG RECEPTIVE TO USG APPROACH ON URANIUM SALES TO IRAN REF: STATE 72119

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Greg Berry, rea sons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Poloff delivered reftel non-paper to Will Gelling, Head of the FCO's Iran Multilateral team, and Simon Mustard and Duncan Johnson, both of the FCO's Counterproliferation Department. They reiterated HMG's support for U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from accessing new sources of uranium for its domestic enrichment program. HMG is particularly concerned about a new consortium in Namibia (not/not the Rossing mine partly owned by Rio Tinto) which is actively seeking new customers. The name of the consortium is Valencia Mine, and is headed by a Belgian company, although companies from several other countries, including Canada, are also involved in the venture. Mustard said the UK embassy in Namibia had spoken with the Namibian government and was confident it did not want to run afoul of the sanctions regime, despite some contrary public messages (NFI). Mustard suggested that the best channel for engaging the Namibians on this issues may not be via the MFA, but via intel liaison channels, led by the U.S. If the USG did not want to lead the effort, Mustard said, UK elements in South Africa would be willing to help in this regard.

2. (S/NF) Mustard added HMG had noticed a pattern of increased travel by Iranian government employees to West Africa, so it shares the U.S. view that Iran is seeking new sources of uranium. With respect to the idea of convening workshops at which uranium suppliers would be able to gather and exchange information about Iranian attempts to procure uranium, the FCO officials agreed it sounded like a good idea in principle and noted they had hosted similiar workshops in the past for uranium exporters. The Ministry of Energy would have the lead on that issue, however.

3. (S/NF) Finally, Mustard asked about the possibility, raised by Gary Samore during his meeting with FCO PolDir Mark Lyall Grant, of the USG and/or HMG quietly lobbying the IAEA to provide fuel rods to Iran for use in its research reactor. The idea behind such an approach would be to demonstrate that Iran has no need for a domestic enrichment program because it can access fuel for legitimate projects. He noted that the provision of uranium in the form of fuel rods for the research reactor would not require a revision of the UNSCR, and therefore should be relatively easy to accomplish.

4. (S/NF) Further to reftel request to contact Ambassador John Ritch of the World Nuclear Association, poloff contacted Ritch's office but learned he is traveling outside the UK and will not return to London until September. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX Kingdom LeBaron