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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI564, SE GRATION URGES LIBYA'S TREIKI TO ORGANIZE CONTACT GROUP IN KHARTOUM BY END OF JULY TRIPOLI 00000564 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI564 | 2009-07-13 16:04 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO6046
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0564/01 1941612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131612Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5025
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0163
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0175
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5563
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000564
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/USESS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU CD LY
SUBJECT: SE GRATION URGES LIBYA'S TREIKI TO ORGANIZE CONTACT GROUP IN KHARTOUM BY END OF JULY TRIPOLI 00000564 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: In a July 1 meeting on the margins of the African Union Summit in Sirte, Libya's top Africa diplomat Ali Treiki told Special Envoy Scott Gration that Libya was taking steps to secure peace on the Chad-Sudan border and effect a political solution between the two governments. Treiki complained that none of the actors involved were fully behind the peace process but argued that openings existed within the rebel movements and the Government of Chad (GOC) to encourage people to negotiate. SE Gration described his comprehensive approach to achieving peace and stability in Sudan -- tackling North-South, Darfur, and Chad-Sudan issues simultaneously as variables in the same system. He encouraged Libya to use its leverage with the governments in Chad and Sudan to work for a ceasefire agreement and end President Deby's support for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Treiki said he would use his position as UNGA President to promote international cooperation to solve the problem of Darfur. End Summary.
RECENT REBEL LOSES CREATE OPENING FOR CEASE FIRE
2.(C) Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration met with top Libya diplomat just after the opening ceremony of the 13th African Union (AU) Summit on July 1. SE Gration provided a read out of his June 29 meeting with Chadian President Idriss Deby (ref NDJ 264) and said progress must be made on humanitarian, security, and political fronts in advance of Sudanese elections scheduled for April 2010 and the North-South partition referendum slated for 2011. Treiki agreed and reported that a 2,000-member peacekeeping force comprised of 1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan was ready to deploy, under Libyan command, to 10 points along the border. Noting that both sides are hesitant to sign and implement ceasefire agreements ongoing fighting along the border, Treiki viewed the Libyan-led peacekeepers as an essential step to bring Deby to the negotiating table.
3.(C) Treiki and Gration agreed that the Contact Group should take the symbolic step of meeting in Khartoum, with Treiki seeing a Sudan-based meeting as an opportunity to renew direct contacts between the Chadian and Sudanese governments. SE Gration asked Treiki to help organize the meeting quickly as recent developments provided a possible opening to reach agreement: the GOC's recent military victories over Chadian rebels had increased confidence in its military and reduced its reliance on the JEM while the JEM's late-May attacks in Sudan had weakened that group militarily. SE Gration said that increased pressure was needed on President Bashir to not only end his support for Chadian -- including providing weapons and mines. Treiki reported that Sudan had enlisted Ukrainian and Algerian mercenaries in the border war and that the desert area would remain sensitive for some time.
4.(C) In Treiki's view, Deby had lost control over JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Deby's near ouster at the hands of Chadian rebels in February 2008 caused him to intensify support for JEM's Zaghawa leadership based on tribal affiliation. Treiki saw this tactic as short-sighted, commenting that "you cannot control a country with only 4% of the population with you". SE Gration argued that Chad would be unable to promote the development and security initiatives it needed if Deby continued spending large sums on his eastern frontier trying to defeat Salah Gosht. Treiki agreed, noting that "even China or the U.S. can't control the deserts if the [governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum] aren't ready". Treiki promised to speak with Chadian FM Moussa Faki during the AU Summit to push him toward a negotiated peace settlement.
5.(C) Turning to UN/AU Joint Mediator Djibril Bossole, Treiki complained that the mediator had spent too much time talking without achieving any results. Treiki discounted the Doha process as ineffectual, saying that Fur leaders considered the Qatar government too close to Bashir and worried about travel to the Gulf. He reiterated a need to restart the stalled Sirte process of rebel-government peace talks, though the SE questioned whether rebel leaders like Abdul Wahid would travel to Libya. Treiki was impressed that SE Gration had met with major rebel leaders like Minni Minnowi, Khalil Ibrahim, and Abdul Wahid and noted that each had significant flaws that would make dealing with them more difficult. Minni seemed undecided as to whether he would stay with the Khartoum government or resume his rebellion. Khalil's ambition to control all of Sudan makes him less likely to negotiate while losing the ability to claim leadership over the Fur people. As for Abdul Wahid, Treiki agreed that he "lives in his own universe" in Paris.
SUDAN: UNITY GOVERNMENT IN NAME ONLY
6.(C) Treiki assessed the relationship between Khartoum (GOS) and Juba (GOSS) as better than Darfur, but still quite TRIPOLI 00000564 002.2 OF 002 troublesome. The GOL recently opened a consulate in Juba and was closely monitoring relations between North and South Sudan. Treiki cautioned that a federal government made up of two clashing points of view (i.e. the NCP and SPLM) could not function and said that Government of National Unity (GNU) Foreign Minister Deng Alor needed to respect government decisions "wrong or right". SE Gration agreed that the GNU was dysfunctional but said that the international community needed to push the two parties to cooperate. Noting that the GOSS was more interested in tanks than roads, SE Gration said that diversification of the GOSS' oil-based economy would be essential to promoting unity between Khartoum and Juba. SE Gration envisioned a food-exporting, educated Sudan that could serve as a net contributor to regional stability rather than a major source of violence.
7.(C) Treiki offered to help as he could, using both his Libyan platform and the bully pulpit of the UNGA Presidency. He said that Libya stood ready to provide aid and expertise in development projects to Sudan as it had in other African nations like Malawi. SE Gration pressed him to use his leverage over Bashir to encourage a Contact Group meeting in Khartoum before the end of July. He also asked that Treiki support efforts to increase MINURCAT's troop level and expand its mandate. Treiki said he was available to help in Libya through the end of July, after which he would travel to New York to undertake his duties there.
8.(U) This message has been cleared with S/USSES. CRETZ