Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI893, THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A POL-MIL DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA REF: A) State 112900; B) State 43049

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TRIPOLI893.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI893 2009-11-05 15:03 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO0019
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0893 3091513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 051513Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5452
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1188
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0858
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0652
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6001
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000893

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA AND PM/RSAT (CHRISTOPHER PETRONE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/5/2019 

TAGS: PGOV PREL LY

SUBJECT: THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A POL-MIL DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA REF: A) State 112900; B) State 43049 

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) The USG does not currently have an established security dialogue with Libya. However, Libya's National Security Advisor, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, expressed his interest in establishing a political-military (pol-mil) dialogue during his April 2009 meeting with the Secretary in Washington (Ref B). The Embassy's country team views the establishment of a bilateral pol-mil dialogue as valuable to enhanced strategic engagement with Libya and in this geopolitically important region. We aim to achieve the following objectives, among others, within the context of a bilateral pol-mil dialogue: -- Libya's participation in the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), in which Libya is currently reluctant to take part; -- Signing of the Section 505 End-User Agreement; -- Discussing budget transparency; -- Addressing Libya's Foreign Military Sales interests; -- Addressing Libya's concerns about the eight Libyan C-130's in Marietta, Georgia; -- Libya's acceptance of MANPAD's destruction and humanitarian demining assistance; -- Libya's fulfillment of its Missile Technology Control Regime (SCUD-B destruction) commitments; -- Libyan contribution of helicopters to UNAMID; -- Increased Libyan cooperation with AFRICOM; and -- Civil-Military training and seminar opportunities (International Military Education and Training, Marshall Center/NESA/Africa Center for Strategic Studies).

2.(C) The Embassy envisions the launching of the dialogue by the A/S for Political and Military Affairs and most likely the Libyan National Security Advisor, during the early part of 2010. Recent discussions with senior Libyan officials have made it clear that it will be difficult to make progress on the many disparate elements of our security agenda without an overall framework and single point of contact to marshal Libya's slow-moving and inefficient bureaucracy. Based on previous discussions with the Libyan Government, it appears that NSA Muatassim al-Qadhafi would be that person. We appreciate the Department's assistance in moving forward the bilateral agenda through the launching of a political-military dialogue with Libya. CRETZ