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Viewing cable 10CAIRO237, El Baradei Returns to Cairo
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10CAIRO237 | 2010-02-23 13:01 | 2011-01-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo |
VZCZCXRO0921
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0237/01 0541343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231342Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0363
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000237
SIPDIS
FOR D (L), NEA AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/23
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM EG
SUBJECT: El Baradei Returns to Cairo
REF: 10 CAIRO 215
CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Key Points:
-- Thousands of supporters greeted former IAEA Chairman Mohammed El Baradei upon his return to Cairo. Beleaguered leaders of the
opposition seem relieved at their ability to muster a show of
support for El Baradei and enthusiastic about his potential impact.
-- El Baradei is seen as an "independent" and viable alternative to
a corrupt regime and an ineffectual opposition. However, the
mainstream opposition appears reluctant to claim him as their own
"consensus candidate."
-- In a television interview February 21, El Baradei criticized GOE
corruption, election fraud, lack of political reform and failure to
successfully address poverty and illiteracy.
-- El Baradei met with Arab League Secretary Amre Moussa on
February 22 and will begin to meet with political activists on
February 23."
-- NDP reaction and government media reaction focused on El
Baradei's lack of political experience and doubts over his level of
commitment. Opinion makers in the independent media also see El
Baradei as an outsider and appear wary to offer unqualified
support.
¶2. (C) Comment: Mohammed El Baradei's presence on the political
scene remains more notable than his message, which echoes existing
opposition demands. Yet El Baradei's sober and broad-ranging
criticism of President Mubarak's regime, buttressed by his
credentials as a Nobel Prize winner and former IAEA chairman,
distinguished his message from that of largely ineffective
opposition leaders. Despite his reluctance to declare himself a
candidate, he appears, for now, to have captured the imagination of
some section of the secular elite that wants democracy but is wary
of the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. The significant
challenge ahead is mustering credibility on the Egyptian "street."
The NDP has thus far stepped back from previous attempts to
demonize El, which had backfired. The real political costs to the
regime of embracing El Baradei are low, but President Mubarak is
unlikely to receive the returning "national hero," his criticism a
personal affront. End Comment.
---------------------------------
An Enthusiastic Welcome and Media Reaction
--------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) On February 19, former IAEA Chairman Mohammed El Baradei arrived at Cairo airport to mark his return to Egypt. According to several Embassy contacts and staff present at the airport
"thousands" of supporters and activists greeted El Baradei warmly
at the airport. El Baradei's return was also marked by a boost in
the number of his Facebook fans -- now more than seventy thousand
-- and a flurry of reporting on his return in the independent
media. (Note: The El Baradei for president Facebook page is run
by XXXXXXXXXXXX, son of well known Egyptian
XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.) On
the opinion pages, journalists suggested that while El Baradei's
welcome represented a hunger for political life previously
repressed, they questioned the value of vague promises of change
and El Baradei's real commitment to the process. Government
newspapers largely downplayed the importance of El Baradei's
return, noting President Mubarak had extended to El Baradei the use
of the airport's VIP lounge and confirmation that security services
would be present to keep the peace. Opinion pieces in the
CAIRO 00000237 002 OF 004
government owned or affiliated newspapers noted his "European
style" of "brief and to the point answers," suggesting that El
Baradei remained out of touch with Egyptians and unprepared for
politics in Egypt. Noting that he has rejected alignment with any
of Egypt's political parties they also suggest El Baradei arrived
without a real "political program."
------------------------------
Activists Generally Optimistic
------------------------------
¶4. (C) "April 6" leader Ahmed Salah, who was at the airport, told
us he was "proud" his movement succeeded in helping to organize the
group of supporters, which he estimated at around 3,000. Salah
said that "April 6" leader Ahmed Maher and activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, who were detained by police February 17-18 (ref A), also participated
in the greeting. Despite suggestions in the press that GOE
security would maintain tight order and make arrests if necessary,
Salah confirmed press reports of a limited security presence at the
airport, saying the police "withdrew completely" from the airport.
Salah acknowledged that the lack of police made the arrival
somewhat chaotic, with supporters and journalists jostling each
other to draw close to El Baradei. El Baradei himself later
confirmed in a media interview that he had decided not to stop and
speak to the crowd because of the limited security presence,
fearing people would be hurt.
¶5. (C) Kifaya leader George Is'haq, himself over 60, told us he had
been pleasantly surprised that those on hand to greet El Baradei
belonged to the "younger generation," but said others of his
generation were present. Taking credit for efforts to get people
to come to the airport, he noted that El Baradei's welcome marked a
return to the kind of activism Kifaya had not been able to muster
since 2006. This he said was the first time they were able to
mobilize people without the help or presence of the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB). (Note: Individual members of the MB had been
cooperating with Kifaya, "April 6" and others in several campaigns
focused on drawing support before the 2010 parliamentary and 2011
presidential elections, such as the Campaign for Free Elections and
the Campaign Against Succession. The MB also participated in
Kifaya's pro-judge rallies during the 2005 elections. End Note.)
Is'haq suggested El Baradei's return fueled an optimism that had
"revived" people's spirits. Political commentator, Cairo
University professor and head of the Ayman Nour-founded Coalition
Against Succession Hassan Nafaa told Al Jazeera English urged
public pressure on the GOE to enact the constitutional reforms
outlined by El Baradei and said that Egypt is now "witnessing a new
wave of political mobilization."
¶6. (C) Civil society activist and Director of the Arab Center for
the Independence of the Judiciary and Legal Profession Nasser Amin
said El Baradei represents a clean slate candidate, someone both
untainted by possible collusion with the regime -- like other
members of the opposition -- and untouched by accusations of wrong
doing -- like 2005 presidential candidate Ayman Nour. Commenting
in the independent press, novelist and now frequent political
commentator Alaa Al Aswani called enthusiasm about El Baradei
evidence of an Egyptian desire for change, but warned that he
should not be seen as a "savior."
-----------------------------
El Baradei and the Opposition
-----------------------------
¶7. (C) Mainstream opposition parties which regularly meet as what
is known in Egypt as the "opposition coalition" (Al Wafd, the
Democratic Front Party (DFP), Taggamou and the Nasserist Party)
have not been able to reach consensus on El Baradei as a democratic
activist or candidate. Only DFP leader Osama Al Ghazali Harb has
publically expressed enthusiasm about the impact of El Baradei's
CAIRO 00000237 003 OF 004
return to Cairo. Harb told us the turnout at the airport was a
sign of a "new political momentum" that would take "competition
with the government to a new level." Harb called El Baradei the
right man at the right time, but underscored that his core message
was the same as the long-standing demands from the opposition. He
called El Baradei an "international heavyweight" untouchable by
government smear campaigns. Press reports indicate that Harb is
the only member of the four party coalition that supports El
Baradei as a candidate. However, there appears to be some internal
debate within the Wafd party. Wafd party members from Gharbiyya
part of the group Wafdists Against Succession (not sanctioned by
the party) were present at the airport to receive El Baradei. That
group's leader told the Egyptian daily El Shorouk that he and Wafd
leaders Honorary President Mostafa El Taweel and VP Fouad Badrawy
intend to seek their own meeting with El Baradei.
¶8. (C) Al Ghad Party Vice President Wael Nawara told PolOff that he
and others in the party welcomed El Baradei's political activism in
Egypt. Nawara added he would have liked to greet El Baradei at the
airport, but was busy working to resolve internal party conflict
after Ayman Nour's announcement on February 15 that he had been
selected by Al Ghad as its presidential candidate. Some in the
party, including its president Ehab El Khouly, publically
criticized this move as pre-empting Al Ghad's ability to support an
opposition "consensus candidate" like El Baradei. Nour's own
comments about El Baradei have vacillated between statements of
support and suggestions that he is only a "virtual candidate."
Fellow Ghad party VP Gameela Ismail, Nour's estranged wife, was on
hand to greet El Baradei and told the media she saw no
contradiction in her support for El Baradei. Ismail said she would
stand behind coordinated opposition support for one presidential
candidate whether EL Baradei or Nour.
¶9. (C) El Baradei will meet on February 23 with Harb, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX and other political activists. Press reports indicate that Dr. Yehia El Gamal, well-known constitutional scholar and co-founder of the Democratic Front Party (DFP), will also ask El Baradei to join a group of scholars who seek to draft an alternative constitution for Egypt. (Note: El Gamal left the DFP
after a clash with current President and co-founder Osama Al
Ghazali Harb. End Note.)
----------------
In His Own Words
----------------
¶10. (C) In his first public appearance since his return, Sunday,
February 21, El Baradei took part in a three hour interview on
Egyptian Satellite Channel Dream TV's program ten o'clock hosted by
Mona El Shazli. Taking questions from callers El Baradei
reiterated his previous statements that he never intended to run in
the 2011 presidential elections but said he would run against
President Mubarak if needed constitutional changes were made and it
were in Egypt's interest to do so. El Baradei reiterated his call
for constitutional reforms, particularly reform of Article 76 which
governs the selection of presidential candidates and which many
believe was tailor made for presidential son Gamal Mubarak, and
Article 88 which does not proscribe term limits. (Note: El Baradei
has said he will not join a party; one of the criteria for
candidacy is senior membership in a party with at least one
representative in parliament, but he has not ruled out running as
an independent which would require the endorsement of 250 members
of parliament and the local councils, likely impossible because
both institutions are dominated by members of the ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP). End Note) El Baradei also criticized
widespread election fraud in 2005 and criticized as "conspiracy
theory" that any other country (i.e., the U.S.) is capable of
selecting the president of another. El Baradei criticized the
current regime, specifically President Mubarak, for leadership that
has led to a corrupt state characterized by a climate of fear that
was imposed by the security services. He cited widespread
corruption, the failure to enact reforms to address the country's
high poverty and illiteracy rates, inability to address sectarian
tensions, and limited space for practice of political rights as the
CAIRO 00000237 004 OF 004
current regime's legacy.
------------
NDP Reaction
------------
¶11. (C) NDP reaction has been muted. NDP MP and Political Science
Professor Gehad Ouda called in a comment during the El Baradei
television appearance and said El Baradei does not realize the
difficulty of the situation in Egypt, suggesting his criticisms
were off the mark as there are different types of democracy that
might be applied. The evening following El Baradei's appearance on
her show, TV host Mona El Shazli reportedly told her audience that
she had received calls from the public accusing her of a pro-NDP
bias and calls from NDP members angry that she had given El Baradei
three hours of air time. Dean of the Cairo University Faculty of
Economics and Political Science and member of the ruling NDP's
Policies Committee Alia Al Mahdy, told PolOff she remains close to
her predecessor Mona El Baradei (Mohammed El Baradei's sister) and
believes El Baradei intends to press for change but is unlikely to
actually run for president. She said that she in others in the NDP
"respect" El Baradei but remain loyal to President Mubarak. She
added that El Baradei's long absence from Egypt does not mean that
he does not understand Egypt well enough to run but that Egyptians
do not know him well enough to vote for him.
-------------------
Meeting Amre Moussa
-------------------
¶12. (SBU) In his first public meeting following his arrival, El
Baradei met with Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa whom he called a "personal friend." The meeting was reported by the
independent media as having focused on the "future of Egypt." El
Baradei gave no formal comment to the media after the meeting but
Amre Moussa reportedly said that all Egyptians were "aspiring for
change," calling it their right to do so.
SCOBEY